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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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YAMANI REPORTED RESISTING OPEC PRESSURE

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text]

SAUDI ARABIA is resisting pressure from other Opec members to hold an emergency summit to discuss ways of ending the world oil glut and halting the downward slide of petroleum prices.

Some Opec members, including Dr Mana al Oteiba — UAE oil minister and the organisation's current president — are alarmed at the intense battering that the Opec benchmark price — \$34 a barrel for Saudi Arabian light crude — has taken lately. Iran last week flouted Opec's unwieldy price-regulating structure, and deliberately undercut the official marker by at least 80 US cents. Iran's move, according to some Opec officials, may trigger other oil-producers to slash their crude prices. The state-run British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) also trimmed the price of its high grade North Sea oil from \$36.50 to \$35.

Dr Oteiba hastily invited Kuwaiti Oil Minister Sheikh Ali al Sabah and Saudi Arabia's Sheikh Yamani to Abu Dhabi on Monday 8 February to discuss the possibility of an emergency summit. The next Opec summit, in Ecuador, is not until 20 May, but Oteiba reportedly argued that with an extra three million barrels sloshing around the world market daily, urgent measures must be taken immediately, or prices may soon tumble. However, Oteiba's demand for an emergency summit was rejected by Yamani.

Why Yamani rejected the summit move is an open question. One London-based oil man suggested: 'Yamani knew that he'd take some mud-slinging over Saudi Arabia's high production levels.' The Saudi crude output is officially a state secret, but reliable industry sources told 8 Days that in

the last month crude production has already been lowered from 8.5m b/d down to 7.5m. Still some of the more hard pressed Opec members are insisting that Yamani close down the pumps to 6.5m — the Saudi production floor.

However, in London, one oil company executive claimed that severe Saudi cut-backs would not necessarily cure the glut. 'Once the Saudis lower their output, there are other producers like Iran, Iraq and the North Africans just itching to raise theirs,' he said.

Iran and Iraq are particularly desperate: the 16-month long Gulf conflict has emptied their treasuries, and this is one reason why Iran, hungry for customers, violated the Opec pricing agreement and chopped its prices.

Other petroleum industry sources note that Saudi Arabia was never too keen about the \$34-a-barrel marker. It was only after intense pressure from Opec hawks (including, ironically, Iran) that Yamani compromised on the present benchmark.

Sheikh Yamani told the Kuwaiti and UAE oil ministers at the 8 February meeting that there was no need for an Opec summit because the world glut would ease when oil companies and governments stopped running down their stocks. Rather than buy crude now, they are letting their huge crude reserves (built up after the Iranian revolution of 1979 precipitated another oil crisis), run dry. This way the oil majors can keep the market brimming with excess crude, force down producer prices and present a more competitive product to their customers. However, European economists predict that sometime after April western governments and oil majors will have to

start purchasing again.

But even if these major buyers start lifting crude in a big way, the causes of the glut remain: a deepening recession in the US, Europe and Japan, falling consumption, and the perennial springtime drop in demand. Industry sources predict that as a result, the world glut will not reach manageable proportions until late 1983 — a good six months beyond their original calculations.

The glut has also led to fierce, price-cutting competition at petrol stations in the US and Europe, resulting in deficit accounts for the majors' refineries. In addition, many of the majors are tied to long-term contracts with producers and have found themselves at the mercy of small operators who can buy at cut-rate prices on the spot market.

As a result, some multinationals are reportedly receptive to Dr Oteiba's idea of a meeting between Opec and the big petroleum firms. This was last attempted in 1973 when both sides failed to reach an agreed crude price and Opec decided to set its own price. But while Opec and the multinationals might still squabble about price levels, both sides want to see order restored to the international oil markets.

CSO: 4400/150

ECONOMIC POLICY REAPPRAISED

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 p 22

[Text]

GONE ARE the days when Algerian leaders boasted that they would turn their country into the Japan of Africa before the year 2000. No longer does *El Moudjahid*, the semi-official daily newspaper, boast that the El Aurassi hotel in Algiers is the best run in Africa, a claim so far from the truth that it became a favourite joke among the hotel's staff.

Visitors today are spared the long lectures they used to endure from earnest senior officials about the quality of Algeria's industrialisation process. The officials are as articulate as ever, but — if anything — even more serious. President Chadli Benjedid's three years in office have ushered in a reappraisal of earlier economic development plans.

This reappraisal has highlighted a number of problems and brought a shift in emphasis in many sectors. Its major conclusion is that the previous concentration on investment in heavy industry had resulted in what the new leaders feel to be an unacceptably high level of foreign debt.

During the middle and late 1970s, Algeria was borrowing at an annual rate of between \$3bn and \$4bn. Foreign debt had reached \$23bn by the end of 1979, almost three quarters of which had been disbursed. At the same time, the debt service ratio had doubled to 33 per cent of exports of goods and services in the three years to December 1979.

However, Algeria's external finances have now improved. It has reduced its foreign debt to about \$1.5bn, of which \$1bn is drawn down. The debt service ratio has also fallen to 25 per cent. This is partly due to a moratorium announced at the end of 1979 on large new industrial projects. It is also due to the five year development plan, launched just over a year ago, which con-

centrates on optimising resources and improving low industrial productivity.

The plan provides for investments worth Algerian dinars 560.5bn (\$137bn) by the end of 1984, but \$39bn of this is earmarked for projects which will not be implemented during the plan's life. Half of this balance is for projects started before 1980.

Algeria also plans to continue the policy it introduced two years ago of borrowing no more from international capital markets. However, this year, the central bank will concentrate on negotiating more advantageous terms for existing major loans.

Another helpful factor is that Sonatrach, the state oil and gas company, was more successful last year than other African oil producers in maintaining its export income. In spite of a cut of one third in oil exports, Sonatrach earned nearly \$15bn thanks to a large increase in the sales of condensates and refined products. This represents a 10 per cent increase above the 1980 level.

Sonatrach's income will be considerably boosted by about \$1bn to nearly \$16bn a year by the agreement on new gas prices worked out with France earlier this month. The agreement will more than double, to 9.1bn cu m, the annual sale of Algerian gas to France and increase the price Sonatrach receives for it by about one third to \$5.10 per million BTUs of gas. The agreement falls short of Algeria's request for oil-gas parity, which would have dictated a fob price of \$6.11 per million BTUs. It is expected to be followed by a resumption of negotiations between Algeria and Italy, which would like to import 12bn cu m of gas annually through the now completed transMediterranean pipeline across the Straits of Sicily.

Improving the level of agricultural production is another aim of the new economic

policy. The food import bill reached \$2.3bn in 1979, and with a population growing at an annual rate of 3.2 per cent further falls in output would be disastrous.

Chadli Benjedid has allowed private and state farmers to sell directly to consumers to counter this. Free markets have sprung up selling fresh meat, fruit and vegetables, products which had virtually vanished during the final years of the late President Houari Boumedienne's rule.

Reforms being promoted in the running of state industries are equally important to Nigeria's economic future. Industrial development has not led to a steady flow of products needed in the domestic market, while bottlenecks and performance failures are rife. Although many new jobs have been created, there is an acute shortage of skilled labour.

The new economic policy also seeks to decentralise what have often become unmanageable and sometimes corrupt state machines by promoting greater participation in making and implementing decisions among lower echelons.

CSO: 4500/109

OPPOSITION TO CORRUPTION NOTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 5, 6 Feb 82 p 37

[Text]

THE ALGERIAN government is expected to clamp down on black market dealing in the Algerian dinar this year, according to western diplomats in Algiers.

Such dealings deprive the country of an important source of hard currency earnings and spawn a wide range of illicit economic activities.

The annual currency allowance for Algerian travellers should be boosted to AD2.000(\$477), *8 Days* was told, equal to the sum accorded Mecca-bound pilgrims. This measure is intended to reduce the demand for black market hard currency and bring the exchange rate differential between the official and black markets down to a reasonable level. Algerian tourists travelling abroad — a million go to France each year, and 900,000 to neighbouring Tunisia — are currently allowed a meagre AD300(\$72) a year. To procure francs or dollars, they are willing to pay more than three times the official exchange rate.

Most black market currency operations are on an informal basis. Algerians working in France, who currently number over a million, provide francs to travellers who, in return, give the migrant worker's family a sum in dinars. An underground banking system has been created, which is proving a real headache for the Banque Centrale d'Algérie (BCA).

Remittances from migrant workers in France used to be the second most important source of convertible currency earnings for the Algerian exchequer, after hydrocarbon exports. Until 1975, 90 per cent of remittances was sent to Algeria through official channels. Now the situation is different. In spite of the 20 per cent bonus offered by the BCA, only AD100m(\$24m)

worth of currency was received in 1981 from Algerians living abroad.

The million-plus expatriate Algerian community officially sends home 23 times less than the 450,000 Moroccan workers in France, and 7 times less than the 175,000 Tunisians. Abdellatif Benachennou, director of the Algerian Centre of Applied Economics, estimates that between AD2bn and AD3bn(\$477m-\$716m) is lost each year to the economy due to black market dealing.

Algerians often travel abroad to buy goods which are difficult to find at home. Department stores in Paris' popular Barbès district are crowded year round with enthusiastic Algerians. They not only buy clothing and manufactured goods for their families and friends, but also goods to sell at a profit on the burgeoning parallel commodities market.

This 'second economy' is thought to handle goods worth between AD6bn and AD8bn(\$1.4bn-\$1.9bn) a year. While disapproving, a number of senior Algerian officials recognise that the underground economy is a valuable safety valve, as it makes the country's enforced austerity programme more bearable.

Opposition to these illicit dealings has surfaced in some government sectors. The French-language daily, *Al Moudjahid*, recently wrote that: 'The resources of migrant workers in Europe — and this is hardly a secret — usually end up in the bank accounts of questionable Algerian businessmen. Indeed, a veritable clearing house agreement seems to operate between the migrants and the parasitical sector of the national economy.'

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS URGE THAT FAMILY CODE BE WITHDRAWN

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 p 23

[Text]

DEMONSTRATIONS by women's rights campaigners, former freedom fighters and trade unionists have obliged the government of President Chadli Benjedid to withdraw discreetly at the end of January the proposed 'Family Code' legislation which was strongly influenced by Muslim traditionalists.

Although both the constitution and the National Charter, Algeria's blueprint for building socialism, speak of equality of all citizens before the law, the Family Code would have enshrined dependence of Algerian women on the male members of their families. For example, women would have needed written permission from a male family member to travel abroad alone or work. Moreover, polygamy would have been legalised and men would have been given the upper hand in divorce cases.

The official women's organisation, Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), and its leader, Fatma Zohra Djeghroub, did little to mobilise women against the new legislation. Two protest meetings in front of the national assembly, a petition with 10,000 signatures and the activism of women who fought in the liberation war managed to alert public opinion and force the government to reconsider the entire Family Code legislation.

The success of this campaign has encouraged independent women activists, and they are likely in the future to seek to make their influence increasingly felt in public affairs.

This is the third time since independence in 1962 that the legal status of women has stirred up impassioned debate in the country. The government fears that passions could flare between modernists and traditionalists, spawning severe unrest. Last year anti-liberal activities by Muslim fundamentalists in south Algeria degenerated into violence and provoked a government crackdown.

Women activists were particularly irked by the tactics adopted by the government. The text of the Family Code was kept practically secret apparently to avoid popular debate on the issue.

Now government officials say that the Family Code question will be put to the nation, and democratic debate will determine the final form of any legislation on the topic. Diplomats in Algiers believe that the central committee of the ruling party, Le Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), could eventually adopt and promote a charter to fix the country's approach to social legislation, as it did in 1981 on the cultural question.

CSO: 4500/109

RAIL EXPERTS PROPOSE LINE OVER CAUSEWAY

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 19 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by Ranee Govindram]

[Text] A RAIL LINE running across the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway was at the centre of talks this week between a high-level British Rail delegation and Bahrain government officials.

A three-man team from British Rail's wholly-owned consultancy, Transmark, met Bahraini officials on Thursday.

Traffic problems

Transmark's managing director Kenneth Smith, principal consultant Reg Gregory and financial adviser Frank Steele from Kleinwort, Benson (Middle East) have also proposed rail links within Bahrain.

In an interview with the *Gulf Mirror*, Mr. Smith said a causeway railway system would be advantageous to Bahrain particularly in solving the island's traffic problems.

"We have presented detailed ideas of a railway system, both passenger and freight, to serve main areas of population in Bahrain. Our ideas were well received and we now await their views," said Mr Smith.

The principal consultant Mr Gregory, said an influx of about 20,000 cars a day into Bahrain is envisaged, once the causeway is ready in 1986.

Bahrain, which is already facing severe traffic problems, might turn into a huge car park and heavy lorries travelling within the port and airport would add further to the congestion, said Mr Gregory.

"If these problems are not identified early enough, the expense and troubles that may arise would be enormous," he added.

Mr Gregory also said Bahrain should consider being part of a proposed Gulf railway system, particularly with links through its Mina Sulman port.

"This would facilitate growth of the economy within Bahrain," he said.

The next stage of their mission, said Mr Gregory, was to carry out studies on the most acceptable routes for possible Gulf links.

However, he emphasised that a Gulf railway system would be a vast undertaking, involving the various states, and the project should be undertaken through the Gulf Co-operation Council.

Joint venture

Mr Gregory said general discussions on this issue have already been carried out with the deputy secretary-general of the GCC, Ebrahim Homoud Al Subhi, and the matter would be pursued further.

Earlier in the week the Transmark team held talks in Dubai with representatives of a local firm and subsequently announced plans to set up a joint venture railway company.

They also met with government officials in Abu Dhabi concerning a proposed high-speed rail link between the city and the new international airport.

TOP JOURNALIST DESCRIBES VIEWS OF CURRENT SITUATION

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 25 Jan 82 p 9

/Article by Mufid Fawzi: "Haykal Talks to AL-DUSTUR: Even If Egypt Has Not Been Arab by Identity, Let It Be Arab in Terms of Interests and Security"/

/Text/ Talking with people, as far as I am concerned, is a kind of quiet voyaging through their minds, perhaps a modest attempt to read their palms, although I am against fortune-telling and soothsayers!

On the voyage, I use the oars of affection and patience, for without affection I do not believe it is possible to "cross-examine" the other party to the conversation. I do not believe in the process of caesarian delivery in conversation! Without patience, I would not be able to get into the person whose wavelengths my vibrations are getting into phase with!

Conversation with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal requires great alertness, because his "ocean" is tempestuous and the waves rise high over it and crash onto the shore; because he leaps with you, like a tiger, from subject to subject, rushing headlong until you interrupt him!

Haykal, over the 8 years since his name was withdrawn from his famous citadel, AL-AHRAM, has absolutely not severed his link with the written word. The Arab press has embraced his pen and he has discovered the power of words and their penetrating power to travel and set forth!

Perhaps the great distinction which Haykal enjoys, and those close to him are aware of, is that he is on a constant trip across the oceans of the future and does not like to tarry in the harbors of the past, although he was a witness and can give testimony to the past. How could it be otherwise, for he considers time an enormous volume which contains men's experiences, their victories, their defeats, their joys and their sorrows!

If Haykal is coming back into the light today, that is because he was a vigorous observer throughout the years of his seclusion, observing, seeing, contemplating, digesting--and writing!

When I asked him, "Do you take part in politics these days, or are you a bystander?" he said, lighting a cigar, an Arab to the core, "I do not like the word

'bystander.' That is a negative description, like that of a deaf man at a wedding as the common Egyptian maxim has it. However, I am not a participant in politics now either. So you can say I am an observer in the active voice! I observe the course of events with my country at the crossroads as well. I observe it with open eyes and nostrils; it is Egypt that concerns me first and last! I do not believe that journalists live in a state of absolute calm. In the era of electronics and the breaking of the sound barrier, journalists must keep abreast of the events of the time and the place, until they imagine that the calm within them has been destroyed through an excess of linking events to one another and an excess of analyzing them and understanding their chemistry!"

I wondered, in my own mind, in a quiet whisper: Is it for this reason that Haykal did not guide his three sons into journalism, but nudged them away from its power of attraction and glamor? Is it for this reason that his oldest son, 'Ali, became a doctor, the second studied engineering and the third dreams of being a pilot?

Is it for this reason that Haykal says, "I give thanks to God that they did not pass through the portals of the great tribulation of journalism?" It seems that this is true, because Haykal himself says "Journalism, in the third world, is very oppressive. The president who once offered me the position of national security advisor is the same president who once imprisoned me, although I was not convicted of any crime! I still consider myself a professional, in spite of my first failure, the failure to know the 'secret' of my arrest. This journalistic failure of mine will continue to cause me sleepless nights for a while, until I can understand that the connection between myself and the factional strife was not at all as broad as it was portrayed. How can I sin against my children and push them into a profession where one reaps fruits of oppression and unremitting toil?"

I tried to learn Haykal's strategy during the period of seclusion, and he said, "My strategy was based on three conditions which I imposed on myself as a spiritual obligation:

"First, I would not visit an Arab country if there were any problems or contradictions between it and Egypt!

"Second, I would not write about an Arab or even Western country if there was any difference in views between it and Egypt.

"Third, I would not get close to Egypt's domestic problems. These are its concerns and pains and it has the right to deal with them in the manner it sees fit.

"Nonetheless, when I could not write for the public in my country, my primary base, I wrote 'about' Egypt, its concerns, its hopes and its pains. I believe that one can set out toward the broader human horizon only from a specific point of departure, which is his homeland and the people and issues it entails, and that this will result in the meeting of his mind with the greater homeland, the broad world.

"Although I differed with President al-Sadat over the issue of the 'first separation of forces,' that was a difference of opinion and that is relevant in terms of civilization. When he asked me to leave AL-AHRAM because I was causing chaos in public opinion through my writing, I left my position immediately!

"Perhaps President al-Sadat--may God have mercy on him--thought that AL-AHRAM was so dear to me that I would agree to hand my articles over to the censor's sword and 'be committed,' as he asked me to be! However, I proved to him that the Egypt of the future was much greater than my love for an organization whose foundations and traditions I had a more than negligible share in implanting. So I left AL-AHRAM and proceeded to observe what was going on. I was, at that time particularly, against Egypt's departure from the Arab ranks. I remember that I went to him and asked him to proceed slowly with events. That was not primarily an Arab position--I considered that Arab Egypt, after the October war, had a chance to regain its dream and continue further to realize it. But he insisted on his point of view, and the clash occurred!

"When I reached the crossroads, I saw that a clash was the only solution.

"Why?

"Because Egypt also was at the crossroads. Let what was to happen happen; the important thing was that the writer bear a certificate that proved that he possessed the courage of his convictions!

"By all standards, I can be held to account for every word I write and every position I take. When I look behind and around me, I find that my conscience is clear as long as I am honest with myself. I confess to you that I have no office, residence or gravesite outside Egypt. The day President Mubarak released me and the others who had been put in prison unjustly, the atmosphere changed and the climate became completely mild."

I told Haykal, "Your clash was a clash of opinions, or, as you always say, a clash at the crossroads. You wrote and said a great deal. I know that you always were close to the peak of power, and not close to the hangers-on of power. You were in fact a party to the axes at the peak of power, and what you yourself wrote one day in January 1977 and told the people who were the closest of all, who were close to power, came to pass in October 1981. I remember that you warned that the popular upheavals that occurred in January were not a 'rebellion of thieves' and you said, 'if we repress this upheaval without understanding its dimensions, it will turn into individual acts of violence that it will not be possible to repress in the streets.' You spontaneously remind me of the statement of an old poet:

"'They accused my stand of being twisted and crooked;

"'But they could discern only the early morrow!'"

Haykal moved about in his chair and said,

"What happened in October 1981 was the visible part of the iceberg. There is another, hidden part! If you ask me about that, I will tell you that it is proof of the development of unnatural 'accumulations' and serious social and economic complications.

"One of the most important things that are needed from President Mubarak is that he see the picture properly; this is because the flame that issued from the gunshots was a flash of lightning, or crash of thunder, that showed what was going on. Therefore I say that we must not pass over the incident of the October reviewing stand as if nothing had happened. Although I am opposed to the dialogue of the bullet, I am getting to a point that I want to underline: an incident of violence was met by an incident of violence! However, you, at a given moment, cannot know who started the violence, and you cannot determine precisely who is responsible! I am confident that President Mubarak, who has assumed power in extremely difficult circumstances, will guide the ship as I imagine it ought to be guided. He is a clear, specific military man, and does not make statements of idle praise. No sincere person must try to outbid him, or, and this is important, he will irritate him. We must maintain a positive silence so he can act and get rid of a heavy deficient legacy! However, what I would like to state for the record is that when President Mubarak said 'Let us turn over a new leaf for Egypt and not look back,' I was on his side and I wished him success."

I told Haykal, "Egypt and the Arab world, Egypt's departure from the Arab stage-- that is an issue which it is worth putting on the discussion table."

Haykal stated, "One day I told President al-Sadat, as I mentioned above, that I hoped Egypt would remain in the Arab ranks, after its enormous sacrifices, and that it was important for us to remain in the Arab ranks because that would define Egypt's identity in terms of prestige and its position in the heart of the Arab world. For the first time, our sacrifices have become a real investment; if we were not Arabs before, and were not Arabs by history and by identity, let us be Arabs in terms of interests and security! I presented two recommendations at that time; history is the witness to that, and my articles have recorded it. I said, 'I propose a comprehensive Arab unified security and unified welfare development plan.' I asked for a unified Arab nuclear plan. However, President al-Sadat had a different strategic option!"

I asked Haykal, "Has Arab nationalism lost its old ardor?"

He said quickly, "I am one of those who believe in Arab nationalism to the utmost degree. Anyone who reads and rereads the history of Egypt will discover that al-Jabarti or Ibn Iyas knew that for 14 centuries it was possible to say that Egypt and the Arabs were the same thing and were inseparable. Egypt has always been part of something greater. Modern history says that, even in the era of Faruq, we had an Arab League, as the result of something urgent, the historical necessities that hold that Egypt is part of a comprehensive Arab entity.

"What forges a nation more than unity of language and unity of culture? What forges a nation more than unity of interests and unity of security?

"What forges a nation more than an unbroken unity of geographic continuity?

"In any description of the growth of a nation, no elements exist beyond these. I borrow the expression which holds 'It is not possible to conceive of any development in Egypt which is not part of comprehensive Arab development.' If you refer

back to my articles, most importantly 'An Open Letter to the Summit Conference,' you will find that I point that out explicitly. A united country, united interests, and a united geography make a nation by all the classic criteria and definitions. Therefore I consider that that is not something we made up as it applies to Egypt. I still consider that the Arab nation needs a nuclear capability, in terms of a unified Arab nuclear plan. Then I come to facts that have been established: there are 3 million Egyptians today in the Arab world. Doesn't this create a bond? The remittances of the Egyptians abroad are greater than the revenues from the Suez Canal, oil and tourism combined. So let us say that from the purely selfish point of view, even if I were opposed to this regional attitude, Egypt's problems can be resolved only in a more comprehensive Arab context.

"I do not like to talk in abstractions; they are illusions that are not founded on the solid ground of reality. Britain, once upon a time, viewed its problems from a purely selfish perspective and said that it was part of Europe. We have not drawn attention to the fact that our national affiliation means that we are part of this nation by destiny, by need and in terms of the future. Therefore we have been afflicted by a 'lack of vision' and we must dispel these clouds in order to see more clearly.

"When you just asked me 'Egypt and the Arabs,' or 'We and the Arabs,' you phrased the question wrong! There is nothing by the name of 'Egypt and the Arabs' or 'we and the Arabs'--we are Arabs."

I asked Haykal, "You say that 'Abd-al-Nasir's era was not a cheap version of Hitler and Nazism; you praise the era and do not touch upon the excesses that occurred. Have I infringed upon something in my question that is sacred to you?"

Haykal said, "I do not hold to and do not believe in blind faith. Consequently you have not infringed upon anything sacred in your question. The second point is that there were excesses in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, but why do we view 'Abd-al-Nasir's era as one of excesses alone? There were positive aspects to 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, unlimited positive aspects. There was a vision, there was a dream, there was a plan. You have to pause before every historic experiment to see its real proportions. In the light of the foreign and domestic struggles, I imagined that it was inevitable that there would be excesses. Yes, there was bribery. However, it was bribery within small social limits, and not in its loathesome form on the streets! The important thing here is that you be aware of the size of the excesses relative to the positive aspects. That is to be fair, if you want to be accurate in your judgments. Then, who was responsible for these negative features?"

I interrupted Haykal: "I would like to ask you if you used your pen to make a stand against these excesses."

Haykal said, "Your question is derogatory of me; it is as if you did not read, although you have a memory which has not yet gone rusty. I did stand up against these excesses. There are 14 articles in the socialist prosecutor's possession which I presented during my investigation, articles condemning excesses against democracy and the Socialist Union. I said that all while 'Abd-al-Nasir was alive; I did not wait till 'Abd-al-Nasir died to speak! I wrote my articles and

'Abd-al-Nasir read them like any ordinary reader. Yes, it is untrue, what has been said to the effect that he would read my articles before they were published. Once he read my article and chastized me for its contents. The article was titled 'Change.' I stated, in just these words, 'either the regime should change or it should be changed.' 'Abd-al-Nasir told me, 'You wrote the article in the style of Ghassan Tuwayni addressing Charles Hilw. I am not Charles Hilw and I hope you are Ghassan Tuwayni!'"

I asked Haykal, "The socialist tide in France and Greece, the Mitterand government and the Papandreu government--what is your explanation of the fact that the socialists won the /majority of/ seats?"

Haykal started smoking again and ordered me a cup of coffee. He asked his secretary to delay the appointment of the person who was to come after me a short while.

Haykal answered the question. He said, "I hope that you are making a distinction between socialism in Europe and the socialism that is needed for Egypt. I believe that we need socialism; definitions or names are not important, but there is a need for some sort of socialism. It is unreasonable that we should now have 42 banks and no control over the money supply. Let's go back to your question on the rising socialist tide in Europe. Take France and Greece; true democracy is the product of the dialogue in countries which are all contradictions. I believe that the civil war in Spain has not yet ended. I do not believe that democracy returned to Greece until Karamanlis. There was a symposium on democracy in Greece; that was in 1977. I took part in the symposium as one of 12 people who were invited from around the world. The president at that time was a professor of law and he was interested in democracy. People started talking and expressing their opinions. I paid attention to them. Hedi Nour, the prime minister of Tunisia, was next to me, and I did not like what was said. I asked to speak and was given permission. I said, 'I would like to ask a question. Isn't it strange that democracy is returning to Greece after a military defeat when the military found that it was unable to cope with the situation so called on civilians to take responsibility, and Karamanlis came down from Paris? Isn't it strange that democracy should wait for 3 years at Franco's door, until he stops breathing, until it enters? Isn't it strange that democracy in Portugal should wait until the revolution in Angola and until the black man is able to break the white man's dominance in the colony to guide the regime in Lisbon? Doesn't that sort of reflection cause you to realize that democracy, in these three cases, is not genuine or assured?"

"Democracy, in any country, can be realized only through the management of dialogue to eliminate contradictions and reduce or dissolve differences. Ultimately society consists of classes and interests. There is democracy in Britain because everyone has a reasonable share of the national income and there are no great gaps between classes. In France I believe that Gaullist rule and the rule by Giscard D'Estaing was a government of capitalism whose contradictions led to a desire for socialism. In Greece, socialism arose as a result of the Greek people's thirst for change, and there was Papandreu."

I asked Haykal, "I want you to think out loud in front of me: Do you dream of important political positions?"

Haykal laughed and said, "How can you ask a journalist about important positions? I believe that everyone is comfortable when he has some role to play. My role is to be a journalistic gadfly, and nothing more!"

I said, "I realize that journalism, as the Jordanian poet Haydar Mahmud says, is 'your crust of bread, your sword, and the tent of your long wait.' Will you be writing your famous byline 'Speaking Frankly' in AL-MUSAWWAR?"

Haykal said, "Speaking frankly?"

I said, "Since you have moved into the world market and your books are desired and sought after, I cannot imagine that you, by the standards of ambition, would want to go back to the local market, that is, go backwards."

Haykal said, "Your question contains my answer!"

I asked, "Have you paused a great deal before the October 1981 incident of the reviewing stand?"

Haykal stated, "Because that is an unusual incident, and the end of an era, I have paused a great deal and still do!"

I asked, "What does the press in the Arab world lack?"

Haykal said, "Enlightenment and accurate information."

I said, "Is the religious current relevant?"

He declared, "The tolerance and justice of the Islamic religion are above currents that act to excess. We lack enlightened men of religion. Take Imam Muhammad 'Abduh and his enlightened interpretations--that was at the beginning of this century."

I asked, "Why don't you join some party? Do you have any opinions on that?"

Haykal declared, "I am a journalist and I do not like to restrict myself to the viewpoint of any given party; I do not want to be a party journalist or play that role. I belong to the news medium."

I asked, "What is democracy, as Haykal sees it?"

He stated quickly, "It is a political expression of the social and economic reality in any country."

I asked Haykal, as the vessel of the conversation was drawing close to shore, as we were returning from this voyage, "What are you engaged in now?"

He said, "I have the draft of a new book on 'Abd-al-Nasir, his historic stage from February 1942 until the October war, in front of me. I believe that 'Abd-al-Nasir's roots extend to that date."

The appointment following mine fell due; it was with an international correspondent with THE NEW YORK TIMES. Haykal was no longer the journalist who receives the news and writes it--rather, he had become news that is followed wherever it goes. And why not? Haykal's articles were frank once upon a time--they were the X-rays of a country through which we learned what the body was suffering from and what its ailment and sources of pain were!

11887

CSO: 4504/194

RELIGIOUS LEADER ENDORSES CALL FOR POLITICAL COALITION

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 25 Jan 82 p 5

/Article by 'Umar Talmasani: "How Can the National Bloc Be Created?"

/Text/ When I was questioned during the investigation the socialist public prosecutor held, a memorandum was presented to the investigator which had come from a security body concerning everything considered to be in opposition to the regime that existed at that time. I considered that the security bodies had been following my footsteps, my writings and my statements for years. I am not chastizing anyone, because every government agency must do its duty in its mission in the manner it sees fit and not in the manner others see fit. To be fair to others, I am not objecting to this conduct, whether it is right or wrong; rather, I leave it up to everyone in this country to decide what he believes to be proper or improper.

Perhaps it is thanks to the saying of the most knowing, the most experienced that the appraisal of events is a matter that is not the subject of agreement among human minds. All that I give thanks to God for with all my heart is that he has declared me innocent of the charge of collaborating with the former regime, for some people thought that I did collaborate with it, and people who lie in wait have said that I was mounting opposition out of embarrassment. It doesn't harm me to be bashful in criticism, since congeniality in criticism is an attribute which God has bestowed on some of his worshippers. It was thanks to God that I have not charged the people I have criticized for working as agents, for treason or any of the characteristics that critics and opponents avoid, to discriminate between persons and subjects, in compliance with the command of glorious almighty /God/, "Urge that which is the best, and the person toward whom you have enmity will be like a warm guardian."

This is an introduction I have seen it fit to present, as one of the statements I will be writing about constantly, out of zeal for God's good repute and not out of zeal for any other desire, whatever its character of motives might be.

Since God, whose power is sublime, stated, in a sacred correct prophetic saying, "No one thanked me who was not thanked and for whose hands I did not do good," I consider that I am compelled to thank the current president for the steps he has initiated in engaging in his heavy task with its multi-faceted vexations. He began by restoring freedom to people whose freedoms had been usurped without legitimate justification, introducing into people's spirits a reassurance that they had

lost for a long time. Indeed I humbly pray to the lofty omnipotent one that he may continue his steps in this new direction, lest anyone remain behind walls who was arrested or detained because of the recent referenda and laws and actions derived from them that have spread anxiety and panic in the spirits of all the citizens. In ordinary laws there are preventive guarantees which protect stability and security in the various areas of this glorious nation; the Egyptians, by their disposition, are committed to their laws and inclined toward calm and peace, and most of their armaments lie in criticism--"brilliant, incisive, expressive jokes."

Points of View That Pass through My Mind

There are points of view passing through my mind on many matters, some of them bearing on the ruler, some of them bearing on the ruled; there is no need that they be properly articulated, since they are just individual ideas which suffer error and enjoy validity. For every human being is in error, and the best of those in error are the repentant, as the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, has said in a correct tradition.

The ruler is the person most heavily-laden and weighted down by responsibility, on account of his grave duties, even in the case of the strongest of rulers and the most equitable of the just. Never have status or power, soldiers or aides helped him, but rather the justice he has fulfilled among subjects has. You all are subjects, and he is responsible for his subjects. President Husni Mubarak has appealed for a national bloc; this is a promise on his part, and a free man's promise is an obligation upon him.

This national bloc for which the president has appealed is the first step along the road to reforming matters that happened in the past and went wrong. May God forgive everyone, for this is the first thing that he is carrying out, in the national bloc that he is calling for. In my opinion, this will not be carried out unless he opens the door to the bloc to every person who knocks on it; and those persons are not deprived of it. It has become truly impossible for him to meet everyone who knocks. There is something which can consummate this notion by the easiest of means, and that is for him to meet with the heads of parties, bodies, groups and societies at specific gatherings, collectively once and individually on some occasions, listening to them, holding discussions with them and reviewing their thoughts. It is the greatest guarantee of the stability of the regime and satisfaction with the rulers for the ruler to listen to the various points of view in the nation he is governing. Although he is now chairman of the National Democratic Party, which has the majority in the People's Assembly, the true and certain fact is that he is the chairman of every party, body, group and society in the moral sense.

I say that the regime's worth, and the comprehensive nature of freedom of opinion, can be attained only if the president is informed on his own of all the opinions in his country. The views of people who do not come close to virtue might contain points which are not to be found among other people. Meetings with the president on a regular periodic basis with everyone who has an opinion in his country will be of the greatest sources of confidence for the spirits of the people and their satisfaction with all the laws or directives that are issued, based on a contentment

founded on their free will and conviction, not on force and compulsion. If the opposition senses that its opinions have reached the head of state, and he has accepted or rejected them after examination, close scrutiny and study, there is no doubt that it will rally more closely around the ruler than the supporters themselves.

In parliaments, the voice of the minority is often lost amidst the noise of the majority, which views matters only through the interests of its own party. For the president to listen to the views of the minority in the tranquility of calm discussion on the sidelines, remote from party maneuvers, is the easiest of paths to the real nature of things and the determination of their beneficial and unbeneficial aspects.

Obvious Points Were Lacking for a Period of Time

There may be obvious points in some of what I am writing, but what can I do? These priority matters were lacking for a period of time. The true ruler, one who loves his people, does not act out of hostility toward any member of the people, whatever his words and deeds might be. The divine and terrestrial laws contain enough provisions to protect the ruler and provide reverence for him.

The law passes judgment between the rulers and the ruled. In Egypt there is a judiciary which gives everyone his due and deals equitably with people who are oppressed by oppressors. It is not totally to the security of a ruler's situation that he deal antagonistically with any of his individual subjects.

The judiciary has been the trusted place of refuge, but when the ruler acts with hostility toward a citizen, where can the citizen seek refuge, when all the powers of the state are in the hands of the ruler? The vilest form of oppression is when an oppressed person cannot find anyone to treat him equitably.

It is only if meetings between the ruler and people who have opinions in the country occur constantly that confidence can be engendered in people's spirits and affection can be implanted in people's hearts only in this easy, smooth manner; whatever is far from the eye is far from the heart, as they say.

It is only if the ruler meets with people who have opinions and abilities, even if they differ with him in views, that it will be possible for every articulate tongue and wise heart to feel this. The most wonderful thing that can happen to the country is for the ruler to be aware of the competent persons himself, so that he can bring them close to himself and bring their bodies close to his protection. This style will implant an affection in the hearts of subjects which he cannot obtain by any other means; indeed, it will save the government large amounts of the money that is being spent protecting him. It is not desirable that the ruler should be protected from the ruled. In addition, this platform will protect people from the evils of vain secret reports that are presented to the ruler by groups of citizens.

Announcements of Greetings: Not a Customary Habit

On festival occasions and at other times we see senior officials filling the pages of the newspapers with greetings to the president. This is indeed a habit which is not to be found in the free world; we find it only in the developing countries, and there is nothing about it that lifts the stature of the ruler or ennobles the people giving the greetings. It is enough for the ruler to open the doors of his palaces so that people can give him greetings in ledgers prepared for this purpose; the matter should end here, and senior officials should not vie with one another to see who is the most eloquent in expressing himself and the most hypocritical with these vain greetings. Would that the cost of these announcements was spent in areas of reform or for helping the poor! If the ruler took some of his citizens by surprise by visiting their homes unexpectedly you would see what a splendid impact that would spread about among the members of the people represented by these quiet, peaceful acts. There would be innumerable, countless features of bonds, affection, love, and reform. It is in the capability of every ruler to be that way; however, abundant virtue and great extensive reform must be realized without concern or suffering. It is enough for me to content myself with this; there is great benefit in it.

The prime minister, the ministers, and the chairmen of the Consultative and People's Assemblies can play a great role in emulating the president from these standpoints. Why doesn't the prime minister meet with the opposition leaders and people who have opinions and ideas in every field, hear what they have to say, with them hearing what he has to say, until the matter ends with the adoption of these ideas? Let the opposition become constructive and founded on sympathy and solidarity; let the name of the opposition become that of the party giving sincere advice, which is the characteristic that the creator of all creation has given it. One way of worship in a religion is to give advice. What a difference there is between the portrayal of two words and their meaning!

Citizens will not be loathesome, mean or vindictive in their dealings with their president. Why should that be the case if they are able to convey what they wish to their president and give him the advice they want, and no slander or security measures for which there is no need come between them, between just ruler and his people?

If it is not possible for me to bring professors of Islamic law forward to support what I am saying, because of my meager education, it would be most worthy for the men of the noble al-Azhar to make this effort, since they are the people and the men to do it and are the people most entitled to act competently with the learning and education God has copiously bestowed on them.

A Great Responsibility for the Leaders of the Opposition

While this is true of the leader, who constitutes the basis, a great responsibility lies upon the opposition and the leaders of opinion in the country, and they must rise to it or else they will be deficient in regard to their duty to their nation and unappreciative of God's grace toward them; since he has given them the learning, competence and sagacity that provide them with this status among their

people, what are they men of opinions and leaders of thought for? "To dispose of this in competition, in talk and argument." What is requested of them--indeed, is an obligation on them--is that they guide this practical, beneficial, fruitful activity.

Do you ask me what they are doing? They know what their obligation is, but I, as has been said, am offering what can be considered knowledge that has been acquired.

They must forswear the arrangement and distaste that exists among them, because none of them is working for personal interests; rather, the tithe on what God has liberally bestowed on them must be spent on behalf of the citizens and the country. Everyone believes that what he possesses is better than what others possess, so what is to prevent a friendly meeting and a search to come up with the method that will befit them and be worthy of them?

Each of them has a point of view on reform, and he might be right in the view he holds. We are not demanding that any of them forswear his views or relinquish his ideas; rather, we are demanding something simple and easy of them which it is in their power to do, if only reluctantly, in order to preserve their country's interests.

Egypt today is passing through a grave seminal phase which is of the utmost seriousness; dangers surround it from abroad and within. Apart from God there is no salvation from these dangers, except unity of speech, unity of ranks and unity of direction.

By unity of speech I mean chaste words and cultivated expressions on the part of all parties, no slander, no backbiting, and no innuendoes. Rather, people must speak of one another in a lenient, simple manner, through the opinions they express, whether they give support or are in opposition. Through delicacy of phrase and limpidity of manner, reproachment will be easier, mutual understanding more facile, and the attainment of objectives more thorough in its realization.

Until we meet again next week.

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RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLY MEMBER ADDRESSES ASSEMBLY CHIEF

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 25 Jan 82 p 5

/Article by Salah Abu Isma'il: "An Open Letter to the Chairman of the People's Assembly"/

/Text/ To the great professor Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the Egyptian People's Assembly:

Peace be upon you, and God's mercy and blessings, following which:

You, in your position are the person who best knows my holy war to apply Islamic law, through the drafts of laws I have presented, the statements I have made in the assembly, and the stands I have taken.

There then occurred your initiative toward the end of 1978 which called for the formation of a general committee to codify Islamic law, which the former People's Assembly agreed to. However, you refused to rely on the judiciary committee, the committee held 30 meetings toward the end of the last assembly, even after it was dissolved, until you received a letter from Dr Ibrahim Salih prohibiting the meetings of the committee in the assembly on grounds that it was engaged in a coverup!

In spite of that, the meetings continued. Then the current assembly was elected, and you know how much I insisted to you, orally and in writing, that you issue a new decree forming a general committee to codify Islamic law after the 1979 elections had resulted in the fact that not a small number of members were not re-elected, and further new members had come into the assembly from whom benefit could be derived. You did not issue the requisite decree, for the reason that our colleague and assembly member, Mr Muntaz Nassar, had refused to continue his work as rapporteur of the civil law committee except on the condition that you issue that requisite decree. You did not issue it and he excused himself from continuing his work. Meanwhile, I considered that working in this field did not depend on conditions or stipulations--otherwise why should our great brother Mr Muntaz Nassar resign? I continued to work without letup. It so happened that the venerable committee, the committee on the judiciary, finished its work after it had exerted a maximum of effort and the utmost energy.

Then came the surprise! The surprise was:

The general committee rejected the judiciary committee's work because it was not firmly grounded on Islamic law! I wonder whether the general committee existed at that time. Was the decree issued after the election of the current assembly, forming a general committee to codify Islamic law? When was it issued? Who are its members?

We then saw you praising the codification of Islamic law which the social committee had performed. The situation did not stop with praise--indeed, you actually ordered that the committee's achievement be printed. I was very happy and welcomed this example which met with your satisfaction, and I studied it assiduously in order to review it and see the difference between our accomplishment in the judiciary committee and the social committee's achievement!

I was appalled to find new proof in what I reviewed that you were prejudiced against my person! The venerable social committee had followed the same platform we had followed.

While the accomplishment of the social committee was that it had approved things in the laws which were in agreement with Islamic law and had removed those things which violated it, introducing firmly-grounded alternatives, and you had accepted this platform on its part and ordered that this accomplishment be printed, that was the very work of the judiciary committee itself!

By what right and on what excuse, then, do you distinguish between two analogous matters?

By what right and on what excuse do you give agreement to one of them and declare an attack on the other?

I stood up in the venerable assembly to state this, with the statement of my almighty and glorious lord in my mind: "Say, 'work,' and God and his prophet and the devout will see your labor, and you will return to the world of the unknown with the testimony and he will inform you of what you have done." Then the sound was cut off from the microphone into which I was talking by your orders, and your depriving me of the powerful microphone on the podium prevented me from completing my statement. Maj Gen Nabawi Isma'il, in a subsequent stand, repeated your attack against me, advancing as a pretext your unfair opinion on the work of the judiciary committee. I was prompted to reply that in the newspaper AL-SHA'B, while it was issued, before it was confiscated, under the title, "God Is Most Great, Minister of the Interior." There was no use in my making this reply, in spite of the soundness of its logic; the late President Anwar al-Sadat launched a severe attack against me in the emergency session of 5 September 1981, using your attack on the judiciary committee and my person as a pretext. At that time I was on the off-season pilgrimage to Mecca; I complained to my lord and testified to him on what went on! What could be harsher than what was going on?

In spite of all that, and in spite of the fact that I stated what I had managed to state in the assembly before you cut me off--"we defy anyone to show us any work

that is more complete than the abundant research the judiciary committee has performed on the articles it had created and the articles it has approved: what we have done is the maximum effort and the utmost energy, and it is entirely fit to be applied, if people's intentions are proper and people's tendencies are sincere," and so forth--your attack against me was repeated in AL-AHRAM on Saturday 2 January 1982, when you portrayed me as a person whose work had been sent back to him for more than a year while none of it was carried out.

This in spite of the fact that when you assigned to my two noble colleagues Counselor Ibrahim al-Qalyubi and His Eminence Shaykh Ibrahim al-Waqfi 'Adawi, member of the judiciary committee, the task of firming up the articles, they informed you that it was necessary to get in touch with you, and you called for the minutes as proof of your view that I should be considered to have resigned from the judiciary committee!

How can you portray me before public opinion as someone who is deficient and demands work "on which in my opinion the application of Islamic law does not depend" while you in reality assigned this work to someone besides me, considered that I had resigned from the committee, and refused to have the two eminent colleagues get in touch with me?

I remember that the minister Mr Mukhtar Hani had previously enjoyed your praise of his civil accomplishment on the pages of AL-AHRAM. Here the civil work is still under study and discussion. How can we understand these positions?

Then I remember that an employee in the secretariat of the codification committees had sent me a trumped-up letter in service of a given objective encouraging the efforts of the committee on the judiciary, which was the first committee in terms of this accomplishment, so that it could complete its work! Our colleague Mr Hasan Hafiz, member of the assembly, snatched it up and held a conference for the people in Kirdasah, in the Precinct of Nahiya, District of Imbabah/Jizah, claiming that this letter was written in defamation of the committee of the judiciary. I have the tape recording of that amazing conference, from which people went away protesting against this charge.

How can an employee who does not have the right to do so address me on a piece of paper from your office?

How could the dignity of a member of the People's Assembly be of such little value?

Finally, if all the laws had been completed and the study of the Penal Code and the economic and social and other laws had become integrated, by what right can we carry some out and postpone others?

Why isn't God's law applied in full, as God has ordered?

Has the time come to reapportion the Islamic judiciary that was previously abrogated by a stroke of the pen, placing the most senior Islamic judge in a position of seniority behind the youngest national judge?

There are many issues on which I, a member of the People's Assembly, cannot find an opportunity to speak, finding instead restriction, suffocation, and continued attacks!

However, I am confident of two things:

First, almighty God knows the sincerity of my efforts on behalf of the application of Islamic law, since the voters honored me with the dignity of their devout response to my slogan "Give me your vote so that we can reform the world through religion." God has the grace and kindness "Indeed God is so kind to you that he will guide you to the true faith, if you are truthful."

Second, the Egyptian people know the sincerity of these efforts also, instead of the attack, which will not succeed in slandering. May God make those who side with him victorious; God is the beloved and the powerful. Our lord, may you open up before us and our people the truth, for you are the greatest of opening forces.

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CONSUMERS FORM PROTECTION GROUP

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 24 Jan 82 p 3

/Article by Ahmad Anwar: "For the First Time in Egypt: A Consumers' League To Confront Merchants' Greed!"/

/Text/ Now that commodity prices have become inflated in recent years, and some greedy merchants have exploited the citizens' circumstances, a new trend has made its appearance in Egypt now. That is that people are facing their problems and rising up to solve them instead of relying on the government for everything.

Two years ago the notion arose of establishing a "consumers' league" to confront the greed of merchants and limit the rise in prices. It would be the nucleus for the establishment of a general consumers' federation, modeled after European and American consumer protection agencies.

The notion issued forth from the Ministry of Supply. It was proposed by Fu'ad Basyuni, first deputy minister for planning and development affairs, in the wake of a decree by the late President Anwar al-Sadat prohibiting the sale of meat for a month. Its objective was to boycott individual greedy merchants without having to get a decree from governmental agencies on every matter, large or small.

Formation of the League

After the idea of the consumers' league had begun to be applied and it was formed under the chairmanship of Madihah Kamal, of television, with 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mahmud of the Ministry of Supply as secretary, many prominent personalities vied to join, including Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, head of the Doctors' Union, Muhammad Qadri, deputy minister of economy, 'Abd-al-'Ati Hamid, Ahmad Samir, and Dr 'Atif 'Ubayd, in addition to representatives of every class of the society.

Dr Mustafa Safwat, the agriculture minister's advisor for self-sufficiency in food, and Dr Muhammad Ma'mun Diyab presented a number of research works on this matter for the league, since its role is to combat greed and exploitation in cooperation with the competent bodies.

The Consumers' League is trying to issue a magazine containing its notions in order to guide consumers and acquaint them with means for standing up to the greed

of merchants and people who exploit the people's livelihood, as well as to study the league's actual requirements and prepare recommendations and proposals and present them to the technical agencies.

The Agriculturalists' Union has agreed to give the league a location free of charge in order to encourage this trend in service of the consumer.

Do you suppose this might be the beginning of the confrontation with the greed of people who exploit the people's livelihood?

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PRESIDENT CLAIMS OIL WILL NOT BE USED POLITICALLY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Feb 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN (IRNA) - President Khamenei said in Tehran Tuesday that Iran was not willing to enter the game of those who played with oil politically, whether they be oil sellers, which game the president said would be very detrimental to them, or oil customers, who resorted to this game in an attempt to humiliate the nations and to provide the grounds for the dependency of the oil-producing governments.

Speaking to Oil Minister Gharazi and the oil ministry undersecretaries, the president further added that the ministry enjoyed political, economic, and technical dimensions and therefore the president said "you are all bearing heavy and significant responsibilities."

In another part of his remarks, the president stressed the utilization of the services of those devout experts who had gained their expertise by using national wealth, and he reiterated the observance of Islamic criteria in so doing.

In conclusion, President Khamenei called on the oil industry workers to strive in moving away the disorders left by the past regime.

In this meeting, the oil minister submitted a report to the president on the ministry's status and then the undersecretaries gave some explanations on their tasks.

TAVAKOLI DEFENDS TIES WITH USSR

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Feb 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN — Talking on the "rumor of a military pact between Iran and the Soviet Union," the Government Spokesman Ahmad Tavakoli announced in a press conference yesterday that the Islamic Republic "will have relations with any country which will not want to impose its political domination on us."

"Purchasing arms and ammunitions from one country does not mean dependence on that country and we will meet our needs from any place we deem is in the interests of the nation," Tavakoli added.

The government spokesman "strongly denied" the "rumor of membership of Grand Ayatollahs Golpayegani, Najafi Mar'ashi, and Montazeri in the Leadership Council," reported IRNA.

"This council has not been formed as yet," he said. Tavakoli added that the coun-

cil will be formed in the month of Ordibehesht, 1361 (April 21-May 21, 1982).

The council, generally termed as Majlis of Experts, "will introduce those who have the ability to lead the nation," implied the spokesman.

Tackling the question of "why this Majlis is being formed?" Tavakoli said such a step is provided for in the Islamic constitution of the country.

The law stipulates that "the experts of the nation should gather and elect pertinent individuals capable of shouldering this great responsibility in the absence of the leader.

"God willing, we hope that Imam Khomeini will hand over the flag of this blood-soaked revolution to the Blessed Hand of Imam-e-Zaman (AS)," he concluded.

CSO: 4600/289

USSR, IRAN SIGN PROTOCOL

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Feb 82 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN — The Energy Minister, Dr. Hassan Ghafari-Fard, who had headed a mission to the U.S.S.R., returned yesterday morning to Tehran and talked to IRNA reporters about the results of his tour.

The main objective of this trip, he said, was to convey the message of the Islamic Revolution to the Soviet Moslems by holding discussions, especially with the religious officials of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

He also stated that the Moslems of the Soviet Union praised Imam Khomeini as a revolutionary leader.

The mission, outlined the strong hand of the Islamic Republic of Iran in safeguarding its independence and establishing its ties with other countries on the basis of mutual respect and non-intervention in each other's affairs.

The energy minister said that he had meetings with Soviet officials particularly with the energy minister of that

country and various economic issues were discussed.

As a result a protocol signed in Moscow by the two countries, pledged for bilateral ties. In this protocol, speeding up the completion of constructional operations of Ramin and Isfahan power stations was requested.

Also, it was agreed to erect a new dam on Aras River in Khodafarin in Azarbaijan (western Iran) with the cooperation of Iran and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet officials announced their readiness to dispatch engineers and technicians to Iran as well as receiving Iranian experts to the U.S.S.R. for being trained.

In this connection, a mission comprising Soviet specialists is due in Iran next week to accelerate the implementation of the joint projects.

The Iranian energy minister announced that it is expected that a unit of Ramin Power Station will be implemented in the near future.

CSO: 4600/289

'ACHIEVEMENTS' OF REVOLUTION DISCUSSED ON THIRD ANNIVERSARY

London 8 DAYS in English 20 Feb 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text]

IRAN'S austere-dressed mullahs seemed uncomfortable as they entered Tehran's old Hilton Hotel, the haunt of the very wealthy during the Shah's regime. The black-robed rulers of Tehran gathered in the Hilton — since renamed the Independence Hotel — to celebrate the fact that the Islamic Revolution has staggered through a third year of war, assassination, execution and financial catastrophe.

The anniversary organisers first ordered the hotel waiters to remove their smart bow ties and don the more revolutionary Palestinian 'kufiah' — even though relations between PLO Chief Yasser Arafat and Ayatollah Khomeini are now less than cordial. But the real embarrassment occurred at the banquet table: the 400 guests, who included Premier Mir Hussein Mousavi, Foreign Minister Velayati and Ayatollah Montazeri, the man named as most likely to succeed the ailing Khomeini, were served chicken. As there had recently been revelations that the Tehran government had hatched a \$320,000 deal with its arch-enemy, Israel, for the purchase of chicken and eggs, the uncomfortable mullahs insisted that the fowl be sent back to the hotel kitchen. The chef had to assemble a replacement dish of lamb kebab.

Those absent from the banquet, but who played a crucial part in toppling the Pahlavi monarchy on 11 February 1979, were far more numerous than those present. Some, like former President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, Mujaheddin guerrilla leader Masoud Rajavi, ex-National Iranian Oil Company Chief Hassan Nazih, former Central Bank Governor Ali Reza Nobari, and the former chief of the navy, Admiral Madani, have

been forced into exile.

Others were less fortunate. No sooner had the hardline clergy swept into power behind Ayatollah Khomeini than they began their brutal crackdown of many opponents. Over 10,000 have died since the revolution began, according to opposition sources. But the executions ordered by the government provoked a sharp response. In one bomb blast, Iran lost over 70 leading politicians, including Bani Sadr's replacement, President Mohammed Ali Rajai, Premier Javad Bahonar, the police chief, and Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, the fundamentalist strongman, were also killed.

Those attempting to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini's regime range from royalists and Napoleonic generals on the right of the political spectrum to the Fedayeen guerrillas on the left. The most serious contender, however, is the National Resistance Council. Based in France, as are many of the exile opposition groups, and led by Bani Sadr and Mujaheddin chief Masoud Rajavi, it is held responsible by the Tehran government for most of the armed rebellion in Iran today. Government security forces rounded up and imprisoned an estimated 20,000 Mujaheddin stalwarts. Another 2,000 were executed by firing squad, but the strength of this socialist-Muslim guerrilla organisation has not been badly weakened.

News reports are sketchy, but last week Mujaheddin guerrillas overran the police station and courthouse in Amol, northern Iran, and held this isolated city for three days before security forces from Tehran forced them to retreat.

However, the Mujaheddin suffered a serious blow last week when the police

raided a Tehran safe-house and killed Mussa Kheyyabani, their second in command, during a shoot-out which lasted two hours. Twelve other leading members of the underground movement were also gunned down, including Ashraf Rajavi, wife of the organisation's leader. Reliable Tehran sources told *8 Days* that police were acting on a tip-off when they raided the house in a fashionable North Tehran suburb. Mussa Kheyyabani remained in Iran as operational commander after Rajavi and Bani Sadr flew into exile, and as such was the Islamic regime's public enemy number one.

Strangely, the armed rebellion against Khomeini's regime hasn't hampered Iran's 16-month long Gulf war with Iraq. Initial gains made by Iraq in its surprise offensive are slowly being won back, according to western military observers who note that Saddam Hussein recently announced his intention to raise the level of Iraqi armed forces to 100,000 troops, through a new recruiting drive. Other Gulf states originally stayed on the sidelines when the war broke out, but when Iranian planes strafed Kuwaiti border installations, the Gulf countries quickly rallied to Iraq's support.

Ayatollah Khomeini's regime became even more isolated when it reportedly aided a plot by disgruntled Shiites in Bahrain to overthrow the government. The plot failed, but Foreign Minister Velayati has since been trying to stir up Bahrain's Shiite community through radio broadcasts. According to Iranian exile sources, Khomeini has also been smuggling messages to Bahrain's clergy of late, urging them to revolt.

Ayatollah Khomeini's threats to march on Baghdad and from there topple the Gulf kingdoms, one by one, prompted an emergency session of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain. The GCC voiced firm support for Iraq in the Gulf conflict, and vowed to 'resist the acts of sabotage by Iran with the aim of undermining security and stability, spreading chaos and confusion.'

Tehran's relations with the PLO also worsened, after evidence surfaced that Iran had secretly been buying arms and commodities from Israel whose premier, Menachem Begin, would be perfectly happy to see two potential enemies bloodied.

Iran's oil policy also angered its oil-producing neighbours. When Saudi Arabia and other Opec members finally agreed, after months of bickering, on a benchmark price of \$34 a barrel, Iran undercut its competitors by nearly a dollar. Iranian Oil Minister Mohammed Gharazi explained: 'Iran wants to regain the market share it lost because of international and military pressures' — meaning that Iraq had caused damage to Iranian oil installations.

The price slashing tactics seem to have worked. The National Iranian Oil Company has slowly boosted production to an average 1.6m b/d, with 230,000 b/d being sold to a consortium of 13 Japanese companies headed by Mitsubishi, and another 700,000 b/d going to East Europe, India, Spain and Italy. 'If it wasn't for oil,' said one western diplomat in London who monitors Iran, 'the country's gross national product would be zilch.'

Under Tehran's tight credit policy, the large part of oil revenues are swallowed by war expenses. Fundamentalist authorities conceded that of the projected 1982 budget of \$21bn, little will remain for development projects. 'Basically,' said the western diplomat, 'the Iranian central bank is only issuing letters of credit for military material and urgently needed commodities — rice, sugar, cooking oil, detergents, petrol and meat.'

Former Central Bank Governor Ali Reza Nobari, an outspoken critic of Khomeini's regime, claimed: 'The mullahs won't last. The economy is crumbling. Nothing works. All the factories are closing down.' Nobari argues that once Iran's economic collapse catches up to Khomeini, the poor masses who supported his revolution will turn against the theocracy. At the moment, though, the mullahs have gained control of the food rationing system. Mosques are often used as distribution centres, allowing the clergy to take credit for the government hand-outs.

However, the future of Iran, whether it holds together or slides into a brutal civil war, hangs on the fate of one man, Ayatollah Khomeini. Critics of the regime claim that when the frail revolutionary leader dies, there is no indication that his charismatic appeal will be inherited by his fundamentalist successor.

SEMINAR DISCUSSES PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION HEADQUARTERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jan 82 p 3

[Text] For the purpose of better harmony and unity between clerics and members of the Mobilization, the first meeting of the Seminar for Clerical and Mobilization Unity was held Thursday morning at Tehran University with the attendance of the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the General Secretary of the Tehran Fighting Clerical Society, and the Mobilization Staff.

A large group of Friday Imams from the mosques, along with officials of the Mobilization of the Oppressed from various places, and several intrepid fighters for the Islamic Revolution, participated. In the beginning verses from the glorious word of God were read.

Remarks by the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards

Then brother Reza'i, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, explained the principals of the revolution and the factors in the victory and continuation of the Islamic revolution during his remarks. He considered four dimensions, the unseen help of the Almighty, ideology, leadership, and the people to be among the factors in the victory of Iran's Islamic revolution, and he clarified and explained each one of them. In the same vein, brother Reza'i added: The Revolutionary Guard, from the Central Council down to each individual member, firmly believes in the idea that our revolution is in the hands of the clergy, which has held the responsibility of explaining and clarifying the Islam of divine law in the capacity of a primary and powerful cornerstone since the time of the occultation of the hidden Imam, may God hasten his joyful advent, until the present, and it believes that if we want to be followers of the genuine line of Islam we must grant more power to the one who is the source of guidance.

Role of People's Forces in the Mobilization

Referring to the role of the people's forces and the Mobilization in the victory of the Islamic revolution and to the necessity for forming the Mobilization, he said: The greatest role of the people's forces has been the affirmation of the Islamic revolution's political movements, so that Western analysts, in their recent analyses, have seen the popular masses as a force that has been deceived

by the clergy. He added: This analysis demonstrates the active presence of our people on the scene and their decisive support for the committed clergy. The Commander of the Revolutionary Guard then recalled the role of Mobilization forces at various stages of the war and added: At the battlefronts to the South and West of the country the enemy, realizing the valuable role of the people's forces in recent victories for the fighters of Islam, has made our cities and residential areas the targets of his weapons. At the conclusion of his remarks he noted: The essential factor in our victories in the imposed war is the true connection of the people with the revolutionary forces, and if they did not have the correct sponsorship, which is the leadership of the Islamic nation, there would have been no continuity and no continuation.

Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani's Remarks

After the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards remarks, the seminar continued with a talk by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, General Secretary of the Tehran Fighting Clerical Society and Supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Committees. During his remarks, while offering congratulations on the birthdays of the most noble Prophet (Peace be upon him) and Imam Sadeq (Peace be upon him), he quoted Koranic verses and undertook to explain the term guardian [pasdar] and its role in the Islamic Republic. He stressed the continuation of the Islamic revolution with greater support from guardians armed with the weapon of "Qattami" and guardians armed with the weapon of "Farhug" and Islamic ideas in the fortifications of the mosques. He regarded the separation of the guardians armed with weapons from the guardian of meaning as a great danger for the revolution. The General Secretary of the Tehran Fighting Clerical Society said with regard to the valuable role of the clergy in the continuation of the Islamic revolution: A clergyman can be truly useful in the continuation of the Islamic revolution, since he walks in the direction of society's innate independence armed with the weapon of meaning, and he is regarded as the truth and a basic pillar of the Islamic revolution. He added: A clergyman, who was used as a tool in the former regime and was acceptable to the establishment is not a clergyman and will not have a role in society.

At the conclusion of his remarks Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, while expressing appreciation for the day and night efforts of the young members of the Mobilization, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Komitehs of the Islamic revolution in the preservation and guarding of the Islamic revolution's gains, viewed the active presence of the clergy among them as the only way to protect them from the enemy's plots. He asked the clergymen of the mosques to accept the heavy and responsibility-laden mission of guiding mobilization forces in the mosques, to maintain their own active presence in the enemy's midst in proportion to his weapons, and, with the full supervision of the mosque councils, to block the influence of opportunist and counterrevolutionary elements in the mobilization's military and economic mosque organizations. In conclusion Hojjatoleslam Salek, Supervisor of the Revolutionary Guard's Mobilization of the Oppressed Staff, in the course of his talk in which he explained the goals of this seminar, presented a report on the gains of the Mobilization Staff and asked for the active participation of clerical brothers in mobilization matters, supervising the activities of units, and running cultural and ideological classes for members of the Mobilization of the Oppressed. Continuing his remarks, the Supervisor of the Mobilization Staff, referring to the

valuable role of the clergy in guiding Mobilization members, said: We will hold district seminars in collaboration with the councils and clergymen of Tehran's eight districts in order to make use of the viewpoints of district clergymen and in order to find a way to solve the Mobilization's problems. In another portion of his talk, concerning Mobilization Staff planning for next year, he said: We will base next year's planning on the grouping and organization of the people and the confirmation thereof following the line of the head theologian.

The supervisor of the Mobilization Staff noted: After the Mobilization is formed and in operation in our country we will form mobilization units outside the country. At the conclusion of his remarks Hojjatoleslam Salek referred to the valuable role of Mobilization forces in the victorious opening of Bostan and gave a report on the latest statistics on losses inflicted on the enemy.

This seminar ended at noon with the combined noon and evening congregational prayer.

9310

CSO: 4640/137

REHABILITATION OF KORDESTAN DISCUSSED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jan 82 p 14

[Article: "A Study of Matters of Security, Economics, Culture, and Prosperity in Kordestan Attended by the Minister of the Interior"]

[Text] Sanandaj - Hojjatoleslam Nateq Nuri, Minister of the Interior, who has traveled to this area to study issues in Kordestan, discussed and studied matters pertaining to security, the economy, culture, and prosperity in the cities at a meeting attended by the Governor General of this province, and he was also present at the great Islamic center of Kordestan.

In another meeting with military, police, and executive officials and executives, the Minister of Interior explained the Islamic republic's procedures and the country's current issues. During his talk he urged government employees to solve chain of command problems as quickly as possible while fulfilling their responsibilities properly.

While explaining the philosophy of martyrdom, he also said: We do not fear martyrdom and we have also perceived that the little groups, especially the hypocrites [Mojahedin], have come to the point of spreading lies.

Referring to the future results of the efforts of the hypocrites, Hojjatoleslam Nateq Nuri then said: Yesterday, an unidentified person, who identified himself as a member of the hypocrites' organization, threatened to blow up the Hall of Unity, and this was at a time when the Sunni and Shia Friday Imams of our country and foreign guests were meeting that night in that hall on the occasion of Unity Week.

Continuing his remarks, the Minister of the Interior said: This is an indication of their terror and fear at the convening of splendid and unequalled gatherings for unity throughout our country. At the end of this meeting the Minister of the Interior, in an interview with a reporter with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, said concerning the aim of his trip to Kordestan: The aim of this trip is to harmonize organizations as much as possible in terms of unity of speech.

The Minister of the Interior added: I will inspect several revolutionary and police organizations and I will study existing problems.

Hojjatoleslam Nateq Nuri, Minister of the Interior, continuing his inspection tour of Kordestan, joined an assembly of guard brothers at the Sanandaj Revolutionary Guard Public Relations office, and presented a talk on unity week and also on the guard's position and the mission which these brothers have taken on. The Minister of the Interior also participated in ceremonies at the Reconstruction Crusade office which had been organized by brothers of the Crusade. In these ceremonies, which began with readings from the glorious word of God, a member of the Kordestan Reconstruction Crusade, while welcoming the Minister of the Interior, enumerated some of the activities of the Kordestan Reconstruction Crusade. Then Hojjatoleslam Musavi, the Imam's representative in the Western part of the country, gave a talk on Unity Week and the activities of Kordestan's revolutionary organizations. Then Hojjatoleslam Nateq Nuri, Minister of the Interior, gave a talk.

While expressing his happiness with the harmoniousness of the revolutionary organizations of Kordestan, he noted that: In view of what I know of brother Asgharniya, the new Governor General of Kordestan, I am sure that they can create greater harmony between the revolutionary organs. These ceremonies ended with a speech by Hojjatoleslam Eftekhari, an official in the politicoideological department of the 28th Army of Kordestan.

Hojjatoleslam Nateq Nuri, accompanied by this province's Governor General, attended the Sanandaj Gendarmerie's morning ceremonies and gave a talk. At the conclusion of these ceremonies the Minister of the Interior, while expressing appreciation for the officers, noncoms, and enlisted men in the gendarmerie, called for solidarity and unity.

In the course of his inspection tour the Minister of the Interior then appeared at the central police station in the Islamic revolutionary court and public advocate's office, and while sitting with officials, the Imam's representative, the public advocate, and military and police commanders, talked and exchanged views on the matter of greater harmony between organizations. He then appeared before a group of prisoners and talked with them. He told the prisoners:

I feel regret when I see you in the prison of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I hope not to see you in such places and it is hoped that you will return to the embrace of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that you will fight for this newly founded republic of Islam and the Koran alongside the self-sacrificing Muslim Kurds and the rest of the warriors of Islam.

9310

CSO: 4640/137

IRAQI POW'S FORMING 'GOLAN BATTALION' TO FIGHT ZIONISM

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21 Feb 82 p 8

[Text]

These days, much is heard about the formation of a battalion comprising volunteers to fight against the Zionist regime. Having the strength of the Arab Steadfastness Front against the Zionists alongside it, this battalion aims at liberating the occupied lands of Qods and to pave the way for the formation in future of the great army of Qods.

This small battalion originating

Islamic Republic of Iran, despite being involved in a war against the united front of the reactionary Arab states and imperialist's pets, has not forgotten the Zionist front and it is taking this measure simultaneously with Jordan's dispatching of troops to Iranian borders.

In this manner, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has practically declared its preparedness for strengthening the Arab

— Asked to comment on the Iraqi claim misquoting Iraqi people and POWs that the Iraqis should not participate in the "Golan Battalion" this Iraqi captive says, "Saddam does not want to see the liberation of the nations and the occupied lands."

from Iran with the name "Golan Battalion" is going to show the proper way of struggle alongside the Syrian brothers, against the roots of imperialism and Zionism, to those people who have been influenced by the propaganda of the reactionary Arab leaders. This time, the battalion is formed of volunteers from among the Iraqi POWs in Iran, who believe that the real front is the Islamic front against Zionism and imperialism.

The formation of the "Golan Battalion" indicates that the

Steadfastness Front against the Qods occupier regime. With the formation of this small battalion, Iran aims at awakening the silent conscience of those oppressed masses who are frightened by the superpowers and their dreadful equipment.

The Supreme Defense Council (SDC) of the Islamic Republic of Iran approved the formation of the "Golan Battalion" during the Ten Day Dawn celebrations marking the third anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran

(February 11th. 1979)

Iraqi captives in Iran or those who have been expelled by the Iraqi regime from their country,

can volunteer for this battalion so that after being organized, they will be dispatched to Syria to act under the command of the Syrian government.

This measure of the Iranian government has been warmly welcomed by many Iraqi POWs who are eagerly waiting to be dispatched to the war fronts against the Zionists.

Lilu Assham Abd is an Iraqi POW volunteering to take part in the "Golan Battalion." Asked about his eagerness in welcoming this measure, the Iraqi captive says, "The call by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the formation of the Golan Battalion is a measure in line with its determination to fight against Zionism and arrogance. This call is worth considering from two aspects, first, that we are Arabs and that it is our land which is under occupation. Secondly, it is an Islamic responsibility on our shoulders which we must carry out.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, despite not having joint borders with Israel, nevertheless, with regard to Islamic principles, it is intent to take this measure."

Commenting on the claim by the Iraqi regime that Iran did not

At a time when the Jordanian lands are also under the occupation of the Zionist regime; Jordan intends to dispatch troops to Iranian borders to aid the Iraqis in their aggression against the Islamic Republic.

Questioned about the goal of Jordan behind this measure, the Iraqi POWs comments, "The first point to mention here, is that the Jordanian regime is similar to the one in Iraq. Secondly, Jordan must liberate its occupied lands.

Now the question arising here is that why Jordan should involve itself in the war against Iran? King

Hussein has no claim against Iran. Particularly since Iran was under occupation. So, what lands does Hussein aims to liberate? The Iraqi lands or its own occupied lands?..."

Warrant Officer, Kazem Amer al-Maleki, is another Iraqi volunteer going to fight against the Zionists. Speaking about his motive for volunteering in the "Golan Battalion" he says, "This is an Islamic move for the liberation of the Arab and Islamic lands. It is the same time an opportune chance to do away with the shame we have tolerated for the war against Iran which is in fact, a war against Islam."

— The reactionary Arab countries are helping Saddam in the war against Iran, because Saddam's fall would mean the collapse of these reactionaries.

have the right to dispatch Iraqi POWs to Syria to fight against the occupier troops of the Zionist regime, the Iraqi volunteer said. "Saddam's regime is an infidel regime instigating the Iraqi army to stage a war against God, the Qur'an and Muslims, while Iran did not deserve this aggression. We have never approved of this measure of Saddam. Instead of waging a war against Iran, Saddam should have mobilized its forces against the Zionist regime."

Asked to comment on the Iraqi claim misquoting Iraqi people and POWs that the Iraqis should not participate in the "Golan Battalion" this Iraqi captive says, "Saddam does not want to see the liberation of the nations and the occupied lands. On the other hand, Saddam's regime is blasphemous, not representing the Iraqi nation. We want an Islamic government and believe in the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

— Zahir Yasin Mahmud is another Iraqi POW, volunteering for the "Golan Battalion." He warmly welcomed the formation of this battalion on the proposal of the Iranian government and said there was no compulsion by anyone in this respect.

Giving his views on a recent statement by Iran's Majlis Speaker Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani that the reactionary countries in the region were aiding Iraq in an attempt to prevent their own downfall, the Iraqi POW said, "These countries all have a single face and seem to be one. The reactionary Arab countries are helping Saddam in the war against Iran, because Saddam's fall would mean the collapse of these reactionaries."

Abdolsad Kazem is another Iraqi volunteer from Najaf who was formerly a government employee but had been called as a reserve, to take part in the war.

He too said that his objective for joining the "Golan Battalion" was to repent for his participation in the war Iraq has imposed upon Iran.

Referring to a recent announcement by Iran's prominent religious leader, Ayatollah Montazeri, warning the Jordanian army that imperialism and Zionism aimed at destroying the armies of the Islamic countries, the Iraqi POW said, "U.S. imperialism and Zionism, upon learning about the expansion of Islam in the countries of the region, instigated King Hussein of Jordan to dispatch his troops to Iranian borders, in an attempt to prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution to other countries."

Zahir Yasin Mahmud is another Iraqi POW, volunteering for the "Golan Battalion." He warmly welcomed the formation of this battalion on the proposal of the Iranian government and said there was no compulsion by anyone in this respect.

He added that all those volunteering to fight in this battalion were against Saddam because he was an infidel.

He pointed out that in fact it was Saddam who had not the right to involve the Iraqi army and the Muslims in a war against Islam. He stressed that "we will obey Islam and Imam Khomeini."

He further emphasized that after the downfall of Saddam, "we will not accept any regime except an Islamic government."

Another Iraqi POW volunteer, Jabbar Farhan who was taken captive in Susangerd (Southern Iran) a year ago said, "I am a Muslim and this call is made by an Islamic regime. Furthermore the Islamic land is under occupation, and therefore it is our duty to fight against the Qods usurpers to liberate the occupied lands."

Referring to his involvement in the war and speaking about the increasing repression of Saddam, this Iraqi worker said, "Before the outbreak of the war, we knew that Saddam's regime was a U.S.-backed one."

— "U.S. imperialism and Zionism, upon learning about the expansion of Islam in the countries of the region, instigated King Hussein of Jordan to dispatch his troops to Iranian borders, in an attempt to prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution to other countries."

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- Jabbar Farhan said that the power of faith and Allaho Akbar (God is the Most Great), is much more than the power of U.S. and Soviet-made artilleries. He added that the Iranian people, in their struggle against the ex-shah did not rely on arms but on their faith and on the Almighty.
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In order to force us to go to the fronts, they threatened us that they would kill our family members. For this reason, I thought it would be better for me alone to be killed rather than all of my family. And this is the true case with many other Iraqi PoWs.

Even those Iraqi soldiers who have no religious knowledge, are encouraged by their families to fight against the Iraqi army or surrender to the Islamic combatants of Iran."

This Iraqi PoW disclosed that the Iraqi army has been instructed to plant mines in front of the Iraqi soldiers bunkers in order to both foil the infiltration of the Iranian combatants and prevent the fleeing of the Iraqi troops from the fronts.

He said that following the victory of the Iranian combatants in

Abadan, he and other Iraqis asked the Iranian authorities to fight against Saddam on the Iranian borders because of their belief that they must fight against Israel and to do so we have to fight the Iraqi regime. Nevertheless, he said they were given no reply by the relevant authorities."

Jabbar Farhan said that the power of faith and Allaho Akbar (God is the Most Great), is much more than the power of U.S. and Soviet-made artilleries.

He added that the Iranian people, in their struggle against the ex-shah did not rely on arms but on their faith and on the Almighty.

They succeeded, concluded the Iraqi PoW, without having tanks and other equipment, and he added that for this reason, he believed that the "Golan Battalion" would triumph.

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- Even those Iraqi soldiers who have no religious knowledge, are encouraged by their families to fight against the Iraqi army or surrender to the Islamic combatants of Iran.
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BRIEFS

IRRIGATION PROJECTS--Work on major irrigation projects in Iraq have been accomplished successfully despite the 15-month old war with neighbouring Iran, according to local press reports issued in Baghdad late last week. The reports, quoting Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, the Iraqi Minister of Irrigation, said that about 110 percent of the irrigations capacities of the country had been increased. Mr Mahmoud pointed out that work on Iraq's major irrigation projects like Al Mossul and Hadith had been nearly completed. The latter of the two dams will be operational in 1985. The minister added that blueprints for the Najma dam were in the final stages. He underlined that when the project is completed it will produce 2000 MW of electricity. He added that this project is expected to be one of the highest dams in the Middle East. The irrigation minister also mentioned that the design for the Al-Jazzera project was actually under study. Meanwhile, he said that a project was being planned for Kirkuk where some 140,000 dunums of agricultural land had been reclaimed by the authorities. Apart from this, the minister said that his ministry dug 487 wells last year. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 654, 5 Feb 82 p 16]

DEVELOPMENT PLAN--Iraq's development plan for 1982 will cost more than twice the sum allocated for last year, first Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan said last week. This year allocations for development projects will exceed 19 billion dinars (about 38 billion dollars), compared with 6.7 billion dinars (13.4 billion dollars) last year. Mr Ramadan added that investments for the current year totalled more than seven billion dinars (14 billion dollars). Foreign trade allocations stood at five billion dinars (10 billion dollars), he said. The deputy prime minister described the current year's development plan as an ambitious one. He stressed that Iraq was keen on ensuring implementations of the various projects involved. Finally, he added, that ordinary budget allocation for 1982 were about seven billion dollars, two billion more than last year's budget. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 655, 12 Feb 82 pp 15, 16]

CRUDE OIL EXPORTS--Iraq's crude oil exports are not likely to exceed one million barrels a day in 1982 because the ongoing war with Iran could escalate this spring, according to a report published early last week by the Petroleum Information International. The newsletter underlined that Iraqi crude exports have been averaging between 650,000 and 750,000 barrels a day from mediterranean terminals. It stated that before the Iran-Iraq war erupted in September 1980, Iraq was exporting about three million barrels of crude a day. Iraqi crude oil supplies

at its three Mediterranean terminals in Turkey, Syria and Lebanon are not secure, said the report. Both the Iraq-Turkish pipeline and the Tripoli spur of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline that crosses Syria have been damaged by terrorists in recent months, disrupting the flow of oil. The report added that the Syrian government shows no signs of allowing improvements in the Kirkuk pipeline that would increase Iraq's oil exports from a current rate of 300,000 barrels a day. Meanwhile, Iraqi oil shipments from Tripoli, Lebanon, are expected to remain around 200,000 barrels a day, which is far below a capacity of 500,000 underlined the report. Elsewhere, observers have told the newsletter that despite weakening of the Iraqi military position, Iraqi leaders have realised that they must prepare for a long-term conflict. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 655, 12 Feb 82 pp 18, 19]

ARTILLERY PURCHASE--Iraq has ordered \$660m worth of 155mm artillery guns from France. The contract provides for the supply of 85 guns built by the Societe Francaise de Materiels d'Armement (Sofma). The guns, which have a range of 24 km and can fire eight shots a minute, will be mounted on AMX30 tanks. Iraq is the second foreign client after Saudi Arabia to buy the guns. Last year Saudi Arabia lent Iraq six 155mm artillery guns, reportedly for use in the Gulf war. Although Iraq receives the bulk of its military equipment from the Soviet Union--including MiG 21 fighters, Ilyushin bombers, and SAM missiles--it has recently turned to France for more planes and helicopters. Last year Iraq bought \$1.6bn worth of Roland missile systems to bolster its air defences. The Franco-German Roland weapons-system is designed to protect airfields, ammunition depots and other key military installations against low-flying supersonic aircraft. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 pp 40, 41]

CSO: 4400/149

OIL OUTPUT SAID TO BE AT RECORD LOW

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 654, 5 Feb 82 p 14

[Text] Kuwait's daily production of crude oil has fallen to 600,000 barrels a day, the lowest in the country's history, mainly because of Saudi Arabia's marketing policies, a senior oil ministry official was quoted last week as saying.

"The depressed state of the world oil market, as far as producers are concerned, is making it difficult for Kuwait to market all its officially declared target production of 1.5 million barrels a day," the unnamed official was quoted as saying by the newspaper "Al-Qabas."

"This state of affairs has forced us drastically to cut back production to as low as 600,000 barrels, the lowest in the country's history," he said. Of this amount Kuwait was refining 240,000 barrels locally and exporting the remainder as crude, the official added. He attributed the present depressed sellers' market to Saudi Arabia's still high production level. "The situation in the interest of producers will not emerge unless Saudi Arabia reduces its high production," the Kuwait official was quoted as saying.

He also attributed the disadvantageous circumstances ruling in the world oil market to stockpiling of crude oil by oil-importing nations, the sluggish demand and the increases in production levels by other non-OPEC producing countries.

"If production by other states is allowed to drop, this will enable producers in the area, particularly Kuwait, to have better selling position versus companies buying our crude," the Kuwaiti official said.

The remarks dampen predictions by Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa Al-Sabah, and other OPEC ministers, that the price cuts agreed on by OPEC in Abu Dhabi last December would help Gulf oil producers market more crude. Kuwait along with other Gulf producers cut crude prices by 2.7 dollars, from 35.50 to 32.80 dollars per barrel, in a bid to absorb the glut in the world market prevailing over the past year or so. Saudi Arabia also undertook to cut back production by one million barrels a day.

CSO: 4400/149

FEAR OF ISRAELI INVASION, FACTIONAL DISPUTES DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 pp 6-13

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text]

THE PEOPLE of South Lebanon were still burying their dead after armed clashes between the Shiite-dominated Amal group and factions within the joint forces of the leftist Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance, when warnings of widespread Israeli attacks took on a new dimension last week.

For the population of this stark hilly region, which has become the microcosm of Middle East struggles, the future has never been more uncertain than it is today. Regional power struggles, innumerable Israeli raids, the rise of Saad Haddad and his enclave, financing from rival Middle East states and the arrival of the Palestinians as a fighting force — all this has led to confusion in the minds of the residents. They constantly ask: 'Whose South Lebanon is it and whose is it going to be?'

The greatest threat of all, Israel, has been blaring out bellicose propaganda throughout early February, treating with particular outrage an unsuccessful incursion by heavily-armed Palestinians into Israel across the Jordanian border at the end of January. The Israelis seem intent on making maximum political capital out of this foiled attempt. The drama was purposely heightened by the decision of the Israeli cabinet to go into secret session for its deliberations.

Tension was boosted by parallel ominous utterances from Israel's allies. Dean Fischer, a spokesman for the US State Department, issued a statement warning that if Palestinian guerrilla action continued against Israel, South Lebanon was likely to

be attacked in reprisal. And Saad Haddad, commander of the Israeli-backed rightwing militias in South Lebanon, alleged that the number of Palestinian forces in the area had 'almost doubled'. Most observers have felt that these developments heralded a new wave of Israeli attacks on the region.

After the unsuccessful Palestinian raid, the Israeli cabinet warned Jordan against allowing such groups from Lebanon to use its territory as a corridor for penetration into Israel. Top Israeli generals took the unusual step of calling a press conference to brief journalists about the capture of three Fatah fighters who, they said, had been rounded up after a two-day manhunt in the Jordan valley. General Raphael Eitan, Israel's chief of staff, referred to 'constant terrorist activity' despite the PLO's agreement to a ceasefire following last summer's fighting in South Lebanon. The most outspoken warning came from the Israeli foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir, who said that Israel regarded 'terrorist incursion from Lebanon by way of Jordan as a serious violation of the Lebanese border ceasefire agreed last July'.

In answer, the PLO's spokesman in Beirut said that — with the exception of the Lebanese border — the struggle against Israel would continue from all points, including the occupied West Bank. He added that the Israeli interpretations of the guerrilla activity were being put forward to justify a pre-planned attack on the South.

Western diplomats expect some kind of dramatic move from Israel before 25 April,

the date for the handover of Sinai to Egypt. There are two options that could fit the bill: either attempt to take over South Lebanon or annex the West Bank. To temper the growing anti-government mood in Israel itself, the prime minister, Menachem Begin, is under pressure to take such a step, spurred on by the hawkish defence minister Ariel Sharon, say analysts. Yasser Arafat, the PLO's chairman, told the US magazine *Time* that he expected the move to be against South Lebanon 'to break the backbone of the Palestinian forces, and to put the Egyptians in a corner.'

Arafat added: 'It would be a good test for the Egyptian president. It will test whether he will keep silent or will move. If he moves, then the Israelis will not withdraw from Sinai. If he keeps silent, it will mean they are breaking his backbone too.'

Since Israel annexed the Syrian Golan Heights on 14 December last year, the PLO leader has warned repeatedly that the Zionist state was planning a large-scale attack on South Lebanon.

At the same time, the Arab press has been accusing the US of giving Israel the go ahead to launch aggression across its northern border into Lebanon. *Al Itihad*, the UAE's semi-official newspaper, said about statements by Dean Fischer: 'The American warning about renewed Palestinian commando operations could only be interpreted as a green light from Washington to Tel Aviv to launch a large-scale attack.' Another UAE newspaper, *Al Khaleej*, said: 'Fischer's announcements are a prelude to an expected Israeli attack on South Lebanon — it is a clear American sign to Israeli leaders to attack Lebanon or other countries.' The newspaper added: 'Washington considers legitimate Palestinian self defence as an act that would involve the whole area in a new military confrontation, while it totally ignores the Israeli atrocities in occupied territories.'

Tempers in the Arab world were cooled somewhat when Fischer backtracked and said that the US had asked Israel to avoid military action against Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. But Israel had said it could no longer tolerate guerrilla attacks, added Fischer.

Lebanese politicians seemed little perturbed by Israel's posturings and were trying to convince the public in a low-key fashion that Israel would not dare attack the South because it is concerned about the reaction of world public opinion. The Palestinians' retort — 'Since when has Israel worried about world public opinion?' — has gone unanswered.

The Israelis have not moved decisively so far because they appear to be divided among themselves on whether to take military action. The *Jerusalem Post* last week said: 'It is no secret that a few weeks ago planned action in Lebanon was aborted because of the opposition of several ministers whom the general public usually regards as weak and indecisive.'

Another ultimatum to heighten the tension came from within South Lebanon, when the commander of the rightwing militias there demanded that the UN and Israel halt the build-up of Palestinian guerrilla forces in the area. Haddad claimed to reporters last week in Metulla that the number of Palestinian guerrillas had risen in recent weeks from 500 to more than 900. He added: 'They are infiltrating without any difficulty into the area held by UN forces, especially near Tyre, where the Senegalese contingent lets them through.' Then he warned: 'The UN and Israel must take immediate measures to stop this dangerous build-up, which threatens the existence of our communities in South Lebanon. If nothing is done, we will do it ourselves.'

A UN spokesman denied these reports. He said that about 60 Palestinians had entered the area to mediate in a dispute between factions of Shiite Muslims and the Lebanese National Movement. He added that some 500 guerrillas were normally in the area and that the additional number would be removed as soon as the dispute is settled.

The Israeli sabre-rattling follows fighting between the Shiite group, Amal, and members of an alliance of leftist Lebanese and Palestinian groups. Last week it was reported that some 23 people have been killed in these clashes. Following a meeting between representatives of the rival groups, a Fatah major told reporters that it had been agreed that his men would organise patrols and set up roadblocks to replace those of the rival factions. These fights between the rival groups were also exploited by Haddad's propaganda machine.

Historically Amal, the Lebanese leftists and the Palestinians have been allies. All three groups insist on Lebanon's Arab identity, favour close relations with Syria, find the presence of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon necessary and most important, all three consider Israel their arch-enemy.

Analysts can list a score of reasons for the fighting. These include conflicting loyalties in the Gulf war between Shiite Iran and Iraq, Amal's alleged resentment of the Palestinians' armed presence in the South

and leftist opposition to what is seen as Amal's sectarian exclusiveness. But beneath it all lies what Amal's leader, Nabih Barri, called 'a crisis of confidence on the ground.' In a recent interview he was quoted as saying: 'We feel that our statements are not always believed by the National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance.'

At the same time the National Movement, a coalition of some 13 leftist, communist and Muslim groups, reportedly cast doubts on Amal's allegiance to the leftist-Palestinian-Syrian alliance, which was the fulcrum of the reconciliation meetings in Beirut between the two sides.

Privately, the 13 groupings within the National Movement are concerned about the rise of 'Lebanon for the Lebanese only' feeling among Amal supporters. Amal's main strength lies among the villagers in the south of the country, who have borne the brunt of Israeli attacks alongside their Palestinian refugee neighbours. Last July, during the two weeks of fierce gun battles and Israeli air attacks, of the 500 dead half were local inhabitants, mainly Shiites. Some 350,000 Shiites in the South play host to 100,000 Palestinian refugees and since the early 1970s South Lebanon has been the only effective base for Palestinian raids on Israel. Barri says: 'The launching of operations from the villages or the presence of bases frightens the villagers.' He adds: 'Israeli reprisals lead to resentment of the Palestinians, which in turn leads to clashes between the Amal movement and other parties.'

But the latest fighting is seen as a spill-over from the Gulf war. Amal claims a special relationship with the Islamic revolution in Iran and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, hence its support for Iran in the war. This has given rise to antagonism towards Iraqi-backed groups on the Lebanese arena, such as the Arab Liberation Front and the Arab Socialist Baath Party.

Fighting between Amal and the Iraqi-backed groups spread to the other groups within LNM because as one Syrian Socialist National Party member said: 'It seems that the Amal group considers anyone who is not with it is against it.'

Amal's quest for 'Lebanon for the Lebanese' does in no way resemble the apparently similar aspirations of the Phalange. The National Movement has made it clear that it tolerates Amal because it opposes any Israeli presence in the country and has not at any time cooperated with it.

The Shiite group, with its strong religious leanings, is also feuding with marxist groups within the LNM. The communist Labour Organisation is one such group. Ironically, its secretary general, Mohsen Ibrahim, is also secretary general of the National Movement and is himself Shiite.

The Palestine Resistance is out of favour with Amal because of the differences between Tehran and the PLO over alleged PLO contacts with the Iranian opposition in Paris.

Amal was set up in 1973 by the charismatic Iranian-born Moussa Sadr as the protector of all Lebanon's underprivileged. The movement succeeded in collecting around it most Shiites who were disgruntled by the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, which was traditionally supposed to represent them. The Shiites, who make up a third of Lebanon's population, were also unhappy with the social democrat's leader, Kamel al Asaad, the long-serving, conservative speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. Amal remained within the LNM and was armed by the Fatah, till 1979 and the success of Khomeini's revolution in Iran. Since then, Amal has felt that it is morally and materially independent of the National Movement.

Amal, unlike the leftists and Palestinians, wants to see the UN interim force in Lebanon (Unifil) extend its authority as a guarantee of the villagers' safety. But a senior UN official last week was quoted as saying that an increase in the number of UN troops in South Lebanon would not necessarily enable them to exercise their mandate to patrol the Israeli border.

In an interview with the Lebanese English language daily, *Monday Morning*, the UN's undersecretary general for political affairs, Brian Urquhart, who has been touring the region, indicated that a Lebanese government request to increase the number of Unifil forces from 6,000 to 7,000 men might be met. The UN Security Council is expected to meet this week to discuss the request.

The role of the Lebanese Army in the South was also brought out into the open during the recent clashes. The National Movement criticised the army as having taken the side of the Amal group. This, analysts say, has taken the possibility of creating a truly national army in Lebanon a step backward.

AGRICULTURAL PLAN FOR 1981-1985 EXAMINED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 15 Jan 82 p 4

[Article: "Agriculture: General Trends for 1981-85"]

[Text] It contributes:

- (1) 15.3 percent of the gross national product,
- (2) employment for 47 percent of the active population,
- (3) one-third of export receipts,
- (4) important secondary effects on other sectors.

An ambitious plan of action:

- (1) promote prairie-land zones,
- (2) develop small and medium-sized hydraulic projects,
- (3) continue the government's large-scale irrigation efforts,
- (4) increase the number and diversity of development projects so as to achieve better production and promote the economic and social well-being of rural areas,
- (5) offer incentives and encouragement for increases in agricultural production--crops, animal products and forestry.

The goals of this plan:

- (1) self-sufficiency in commodities,
- (2) production growing at a faster rate than demand,
- (3) a rational exploitation of the country's agricultural potential,
- (4) Jemaa Shaim (450 hectares): withdrawal from the Safi canal,
- (5) Moyen Sebou and Inaouene Aval (13,700 hectares): irrigation from the Oued Sebou and Inaouene,

(6) Bac el Hamri (200 hectares): irrigation with water from the Al Massira reservoir

--areas to be renovated with medium-sized hydraulic projects

--areas where flood waters spread (2,100 hectares) at Batmat

--Jamaa (Oujda Province) and Tagant (Guelmim Province): areas of small hydraulic projects (5,000 hectares/year), timely management of small areas used for raising fish.

Study program (80,650 hectares): Prospecting, definition of potential, etc....

(1) General studies (DH 18 million) in preSahara zones and in areas of small and medium-sized hydraulic projects,

(2) administrative infrastructure.

Credit for payment (DH 100 million)

Credit for commitments (DH 34 (8 million) [as published])

(1) purchase of land, construction of buildings, purchase of material.

Water, Forest and Soil Conservation:

The program that has been adopted for water and forests is part of a forestry policy designed to assign multipurpose functions to forests, namely the satisfaction of the country's needs for woody products (firewood, wood for crafts, industrial wood, etc), a contribution to exports in the form of cork, esparto paper and paper pulp, participation in the food industry and contribution to the survival of herds and to soil protection against erosion and flooding (by acting as a barrier).

The credits needed for the implementation of this program amount to DH 893 million, divided as follows:

(1) equipment for forests and increase in management funds (DH 89 million)

(2) reforestation (DH 360 million)

--22,000 hectares of plantation

--improvement and protection of existing plantations

--reforestation inventory study on 104,000 hectares.

(3) protection and restoration of soils, measures to combat erosion (DH 157.5 million)

(4) integrated development project upstream on the Loukkos (DH 183.91 million)

Zaz Valley: intensification of farming, introduction of beets.

--Upper Loukkos: intensification of cereal farming, equipping of 400 irrigated hectares and improvement of goat production.

(5) national forestry inventory forest management, improvement and study of routes (DH 64.18 million)

(6) pisciculture, hunting, environment (DH 21.06 million)

- creation of hydrobiology and pisciculture centers
- starting up of three pilot projects for trout, carp and eel raising.
- creation of a fauna research center
- creation of five reserve parks.

(7) study and marketing of forest products (DH 8.3 million)

(8) Forestry research (DH 9 million)

Agronomical Research

Economic research concentrates mainly on ecology, plant technology and animal technology.

Ecology includes a number of basic disciplines which provide knowledge about the environment.

Plant technology includes crop improvement techniques and units specializing in speculative crops: cereals, legumes.

Animal technology in agriculture deals with the adaptation of varieties which can accelerate the speculative expansion, in particular when serious difficulty is experienced.

Credits needed for the implementation of the operations provided for by the 1981-85 program amount to DH 207.6 million, divided as follows:

- experiment stations: DH 102.9 million
- regional centers: DH 17.2 million
- central stations: DH 47.0 million
- general and specialized studies: DH 40.5 million

Protection of plants, control techniques and fraud repression: DH 213 million

Land conservation and topographical work: DH 160 million

Agricultural teaching:

The action program includes investment in infrastructure which should make it possible to achieve the concrete training goals set.

The budget of DH 151.2 million covers extensions and material for existing establishments as well as central services and new operations.

(1) the establishment of five training centers in Miasour, Ifrane, Tetouan, Er-ra-chidia and Laayoune (DH 49.6 million)

(2) extension

- of the Hassan II Agronomy Institute (DH 40 million)
- of the National Agriculture School of Meknes (DH 16.9 million)
- of the National Forestry School (DH 5.3 million)
- of the Accessory Techniques Training Schools (DH 22 million)
- of the Agricultural Training Centers of Chaoia, Tiflet and Sahel Boutahar (DH 16.8 million).

Planning and economic affairs:

The action program provides for redoubled efforts in planning, agroeconomic studies, and processing of statistical information so as better to identify obstacles to development in the agricultural sector and to channel the government's investments in the wisest way.

Overall, credits for planning and economic affairs amount to DH 129 million, divided as follows:

- Planning, preparation and follow-up of projects: DH 6.82 million
- Agroeconomic studies: DH 10.36 million
- Processing of statistical information: DH 94.9 million
- Administrative infrastructures: DH 16.92 million

Government offices and state-owned companies:

(1) Interprofessional National Office of Cereals and Legumes (ONICI)

The program of action of this office concerns:

- the setting up of new stocking facilities for cereals holding 1.05 million quintals [105 million kilograms] at the ports of Tanger, Nador and Agadir (DH 295 million)
- internal stocking facilities: construction of 31 silos with a total capacity of 6.2 million quintals [620 million kilograms], 1.8 quintals of which are to be built during the implementation of the plan (DH 1,125,000)
- milling equipment: increase in crushing capacity to 34 million quintals.

(2) National Society for the Marketing of Seeds (SONOCOS): credit of DH 74.45 million for:

- the purchasing of modern equipment for the conditioning and treatment of seeds,
- the extension and construction of warehouses,
- the extension of five regional centers: Rommanie, Fquih Ben Salah, Meknes, Sidi Kacem and Settati,
- the creation of four subcenters or stock depots in the utilization zones of Khenifra, Oued Zem, Safi and Khemisset,
- creation of five new regional centers for stocks and conditioning in the production zones of Taroudant, Marrakesh, Berkane, Larache and Taza.

The installation of a refrigeration center with a capacity of 10,000 tons, in particular for the preservation of seed potatoes.

--Improvement of the distribution and market network.

(3) Management Company of Agricultural Lands (SOGETA)

--purchase of agricultural material,
--planting of 2,595 new hectares including 1,595 hectares of vineyards, 80 hectares of citrus fruit, 120 hectares of olive trees and 199 hectares of rosaceous plants,
--renewal and extension of the pedigreed dairy herd by purchasing 2,300 pregnant heifers,
--equipping of a citrus station to include packing,
--joint construction with COMAPRA [Moroccan Company for the Commercialization of Agricultural Products] a new factory able to process 200,000 quintals of rice per year.

Total investments for the 5-year period, amount to DH 110.0 million are distributed as follows:

	DH x 10 ³
--plantings	44,974
--animal husbandry	25,230
--agroindustrial	8,100
Means of production:	32,313
--hydraulic material	2,100
Agricultural material	26,903
Accessory equipment	3,310

(4) National Company for the Development of Animal Husbandry (SNDE):

Action planned for SNDE during the 1981-85 period regards:

--the establishment of a poultry complex in the Tensift economic region. This complex will be financed by BAD [African Development Bank] and will include: an incubator; a unit for choice chickens; a slaughterhouse; a grading unit; and an egg-laying unit;

--The establishment of 600 pedigreed meat heifers (Santa Gertrudis and Limousine) on the lands of Benslimane and Zouada.

--The creation of two pilot feed lots in the economic region of Tensift and in the Souss.

--The establishment of other production units for female goats, camels and heifers.

This program will require an estimated investment of DH 144 million.

(5) The Moroccan Company for Agricultural Management and Exploitation (COMAGRI):

--The improvement of existing buildings;
--The construction of stables, a sheep pen, and ensilage pits;
--The importation of 3,300 purebred heifers (DH 21 million);
--The purchase of agricultural material worth DH 23 million (9 million of which are to be provided in the framework of the Moroccan-Canadian loan agreement).

(6) Moroccan Trading Company for Agricultural Products (COMAPRA): DH 8 million.

- Increase in the number of purchasing centers at production sites for cotton and sunflowers;
- Renovation of the Souk Sebt cotton factory;
- Purchase of 10 new shelling machines, thus bringing the shelling capacity of presently operating factories to 40,000 tons per year;
- The construction of a rice mill jointly with SOGETA.

(7) National Fund for Agriculture Credits (CNCA): CNCA expects to grant DH 11.11 billion in credits during the 1981-85 five-year plan, DH 5.75 billion of it in short-term credits and DH 5.36 billion in medium-term credits.

- Opening of about 20 regional and local funds;
- The setting in operation of about 50 mobile offices.

The CNCA will finance these plans with funds from both the internal and external markets.

(8) Agricultural Development Company (SODEA):

SODEA's 5-year program, which will require a budget of DH 69.3 million, will emphasize two principal speculations; citrus crops and grapes.

(a) Citrus:

- planting of 3,965 hectares;
- supplementary production of 100,000 plants per year partially to meet the needs of the private sector for plants.

(b) Vineyards:

- planting of 100 hectares per year of vineyards.

(c) Other fruits:

- maximum exploitation of land in traditional areas: apples, pears....
- progressive renewal of old orchards;
- introduction of selected varieties: peaches, nectarines;
- introduction of varieties adapted to mild winters in certain regions: Oujda, Gharb, El Kelaa;
- planting of 454 hectares of rosaceous plants, 150 hectares of olives and 110 hectares of forest trees.

9855

CSO: 4519/106

BRIEFS

CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION--Qatar produced an average of 405,000 b/d of crude in 1981 and exported 392,000 barrels daily, according to Ali Jaidah, managing director of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC). Jaidah said that the production figure showed a 14.4 percent decline compared to that of the previous year, following the OPEC decision to cut back output by 10 percent. He said that offshore production which accounts for 45 percent of the country's total output, fell 25 percent, while onshore fields produced 8 percent less during 1981. The corporation's petrochemical complex and the natural gas liquids plant, completed last year, have started exporting. Work has started on a new refinery with a production capacity of 50,000 b/d. The plant, costing \$131m, is scheduled to come onstream next year. During 1981 QGPC drilled three offshore and two onshore wells, Jaidah said. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 pp 58, 59]

CSO: 4400/149

GOVERNMENT REPORTED COOL TO U.S. RDF PROPOSAL

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 pp 27-28

[Article by Russell Warren Howe]

[Text]

US DEFENCE Secretary Caspar Weinberger ran into difficulties on his three-day trip to Saudi Arabia, an attempt to persuade the kingdom to play a more direct role in Rapid Deployment Force planning. Weinberger argued that the Reagan administration, while losing popularity fast at home by its cuts in social programmes, was allocating \$4bn in the fiscal 1983 budget for the defence of the Gulf oilfields.

Aides say that Weinberger, in pleading for US base facilities on Saudi territory, told his host, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan: 'Within the next few years, the Soviet Union will become partly dependent on imported oil ... the worry is that they would move down through the passes ... to seize the oilfields.'

Sultan and his generals argued that the principal threats to Saudi Arabia at present were, first, Israel, and second, Iran. Soviet forces might come to the aid of a weakened regime in South Yemen, but any spillover from this into the kingdom could be handled by Saudi forces, perhaps with the help of Gulf Cooperation Council troops. A US presence 'over the horizon', as a last resort, was all that was needed. A US military presence going beyond the present 950 advisers and technicians, some associated with the Awacs force, would serve as a pretext to the Soviets rather than as a deterrent. One Saudi officer is said to have declared bluntly that the US was a 'greater threat' to the oilfields.

Weinberger had to settle for the creation of a 'joint Saudi-US military committee' which Pentagon sources said should make it easier to get increased arms supplies for Riyadh through Congress, and which Saudi sources said was comparable to the

'strategic cooperation memorandum' which the US signed with Israel and then suspended. However, Crown Prince Fahd declined an invitation to visit Washington in the near future, telling Weinberger he wanted to see what US policy on Palestine would be after April.

Although the Saudis do not discount the possibility of Soviet mischief, notably in supporting dissidents, a direct Soviet invasion of the oilfields is not seen as a near-term threat. This view is supported by a senior State Department analyst, who told *8 Days* recently that the US airforce could stop the passage of Soviet troops through the five passes leading to Iran and Iraq.

The *New York Times* correspondent travelling with Weinberger reported 'wide differences between the US and Saudi Arabia on the nature of threats to the Gulf region and on ways to meet them.' He said that 'Saudi leaders spent much of the time pointing to Israel as the primary threat to Saudi Arabia.'

On the day of Weinberger's arrival, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a warning to Iran against 'subversive activities' in the region. This was at the end of a GCC meeting called to discuss an alleged Iranian plot against the government of Bahrain.

In what appeared to be an appeal for wider allied support for his Saudi mission, Weinberger was quoted in the US press as telling accompanying correspondents that the RDF was 'intended to protect Gulf oil less for the US and more for Europe, Israel and Japan ... and to deny oil to the Soviets.'

Saudi sources say that their relatively cool reception for Weinberger — a former

and perhaps future director of the giant Bechtel construction firm, with many friends and acquaintances in the kingdom — was partly due to reports of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's dissatisfaction with his Washington trip.

These reports, presumably received through Arab countries which have relations with Egypt such as Oman and Morocco, say that Mubarak concluded that the Reagan administration has still not come to terms with the fact that the Palestinian issue is crucial. Nor apparently do they realise the depth of Saudi feeling, particularly about East Jerusalem. These reports also say that Egypt is prepared to go along with cosmetic Palestinian 'autonomy' talks with Israel, but is not convinced that Cairo should follow Washington in accepting Tel Aviv's proposal that they end on a carefully worded 'declaration of principles', since the principles have already been clearly stated in the Camp David accords.

Mubarak's conclusions, his clear desire to see Egypt resume its natural major rôle in mainstream Arab affairs, and his Washington announcement that Cairo is seeking — with Belgrade and New Delhi — to revive the Non-Aligned Movement, have all apparently encouraged the Saudis to curb their friendly relations with Washington.

The Saudis were also disturbed by what was described as an interview with Reagan published on 7 February by the German Sunday newspaper *Die Welt am Sonntag*, in which the president is quoted as calling Israel a 'strategic treasure'. Reagan is also supposed to have said that 'in contrast to other pro-western states like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Israel is strong. After the overthrow of the Shah, Israel remains the only reliable ally of America in the Middle East.

'Israel does not depend on the existence of an autocratic ruler. It is guided by a democratic purpose, national unity. It has the technical and military foundations to make it capable of being a loyal ally of America.' The paper said that Reagan had also spoken of using Israel to 'defend the

Mediterranean area.' *Die Welt am Sonntag* later said that it had pieced the 'interview' together from various statements made by Reagan, mostly during the 1980 presidential campaign.

Also disturbing to Riyadh was the arrival in the US of an Israeli defence ministry delegation. Its aim was to try to persuade General Dynamics or the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation to share investment in, and production of, the new Lavi fighter-bomber. The Israeli design is similar to, but much cheaper than, the Northrop F18 Hornet which Israel had originally requested. Pratt and Whitney, which refused to allow Israel to co-produce its Hornet engine for the Lavi, has now changed its mind, apparently under pressure from the White House, defence sources say. (The Pentagon opposed both F18 sales to Israel and co-production of its engine.)

Yet another area of concern in Riyadh was the statement by Secretary Haig at his press conference at the end of Mubarak's visit. Haig said that the US was looking closely at a 'build-up of Soviet weapons' with the PLO force in Lebanon. Since nearly all PLO weapons are of Soviet manufacture, and the reinforcement of Palestinian positions in South Lebanon took place many months ago, diplomatic reporters noted that the statement could be taken as an excuse by Israel to intervene in South Lebanon, invoking the 'Soviet threat' — an intervention which the US is trying to discourage. Haig appeared to be very tired at the conference and, observers believe, may have made a diplomatic slip.

The Saudis have high praise for Mubarak's Washington and European trip, including his joint statement with West German President Karl Carstens that both Cairo and Bonn wanted a Middle East peace plan that 'embodies the rights of the Palestinian people as well as the claim to security of all states in the region, including Israel.' They also endorse Mubarak's appeal for a greater European role in the peace process.

Informed sources say that Saudi officials confirmed to Weinberger that the kingdom may cut oil production this year from the current 8m b/d approximately to 7.5m b/d (down from 10.3m last year). According to Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani, Saudi financial needs could be met from production as low as 6.2m b/d.

INTERVIEW WITH UN REPRESENTATIVE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 209, 23 Nov 81 pp 22-23

[Interview with Shaykh Ahmad 'Abd al-Jabbar, permanent Saudi representative at UN: "It Is No Longer Possible to Ignore the Soviets, and the Final Solution Is in the Hands of the Palestinians"; date not specified]

[Text] Consecutive dispatches between Riyadh and Moscow indicate the possibility of renewing diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union. It is said that the Kingdom asked in exchange that the Soviet Union agree to a Saudi initiative which would contain eight points to implement a complete settlement of the Middle East question. But the Saudi representative in the UN in New York hastened to explain the Saudi initiative and described it as a "recognition of Israel"! The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs retorted with an uncategorical statement in which it denies this explanation. Whatever the final interpretation, the Arab region quickly voiced its opposition to it in the events prior to the Fez summit meeting at the end of this November. Shaykh Ahmad 'Abd al-Jabbar, permanent Saudi representative at the UN in Geneva, is one of the high officials who has helped formulate Saudi policy in the past and still adheres to it in detail. In his economic and political functions in dealing with the affairs of the Kingdom vis-a-vis the specialized UN agencies, he is an expert in international relations, which enables him to examine what is going on behind the scenes. AL-DUSTUR conducted the following interview with him:

[Question] How is Saudi Arabia undertaking its role at the present time?

[Answer] We are a state of strategic importance in view of our geographical location, and of spiritual importance with regard to the presence of the holy places on our soil. In addition, we are a major petroleum state in the world. These characteristics have not suddenly changed, and our country's plot of land has not grown, but our feelings of responsibility toward the world have developed somewhat. With it our feelings toward those who are suffering in the Arab states have also grown--these states which stand up against Israeli occupation and the recalcitrant current in the Gulf--in order to set up some kind of control so that some states may achieve an influence in the region, and be able to resist the Soviet advance.

[Question] By this do you mean that you do not believe in the existence of a real danger to the Gulf from the Soviet Union?

[Answer] I personally do not believe in the existence of such a danger. But the discriminating man must design his policy in such a way as to ward off any danger from any source before its occurrence, especially since we have recently seen the creation of a precedent we did not have in the past, and that is that one country invaded another, as Tanzania did in Uganda, without any criticism from the UN or any protest from any state.

[Question] The Arabs today face a systematic Israeli attack on the South and North of Lebanon. Last summer Israel went even further and attacked the nuclear reactor in Baghdad in violation of international law, without anyone (outside the Arab camp) taking the trouble to protest until the UN meeting last week, which issued a decision to censure the oppressive Israeli action. Do you think that the international community feels bored, immobile and reluctant, or that its understanding of the appraisal of acts of aggression has changed?

[Answer] The international community condemns the abuse of the rights of others. But the U.S. blocked the condemnation of such acts in the Security Council. Likewise, it blocked the adoption in the Security Council of a judicious resolution to deal with this matter.

[Question] This right of veto prevents the adoption of just resolutions, but doesn't it also sometimes prevent the adoption of unjust solutions? Isn't it a two-edged sword?

[Answer] It is beneficial in some respects and harmful in others; it depends on the substance of the resolution. Russia for example raised the banner of partition and legalization against it in 1947, and was opposed by the Ukraine and White Russia. The communist states at the time of the partition of Palestine were six states, as were the Arab states. The United States was the second country to recognize Israel. The then American president, Mr Truman, left his house in his pajamas to publicly announce his country's recognition of Israel, while at the same time the American representative, Warren Eston, was in the General Assembly defending the plan to impose a mandate on Palestine. The proposed administrator of the mandate, whose name was not disclosed at the time, was the next American president, General Eisenhower. The Soviet representative of the time, Mr Gromyko, rose and said, "I am surprised that the American representative is defending this mandate plan at the same time as his president announces the establishment of the State of Israel and his government's recognition of it." Then the Cuban representative, whose country at that time was subject to the rule of Battista before Castro came in with the communist regime, said, "The Soviet delegation has more accurate information on what is going on in Washington than the American delegation."

[Question] Good! But you do not want to minimize the importance of developments which have occurred since that time or the importance of the states which have undertaken a crucial role in supporting the Palestinian cause, among whom are the Soviet Union, which has recently undertaken an undeniable role in strengthening this support.

[Answer] We do not minimize the importance of these states and we know that the Soviet Union has recently taken an important role to help the Palestinian cause.

[Question] Kuwait has had excellent relations with the Soviet Union since 1962, in order to establish an international balance in the region, and many high officials in the Emirates and Qatar have called for the consecration of this necessary step in foreign policy. But strong voices still oppose this sort of diplomatic representation and insist on speaking of "the necessity of protecting the region," meaning increased reliance on the United States, militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. What is your position on this deep confusion in the determination of foreign policy?

[Answer] We are not for the United States alone, but rather we are for all states without exception. The Soviet Union has undertaken to support the Palestinian cause, of that there is no doubt, but this does not justify its annihilation of a peaceful Muslim state like Afghanistan. The right to self-determination is an inseparable right enjoyed by all peoples without exception. If the United States and some Western European states are supplying Israel with money, equipment and weapons, the Soviet Union allowed Israel to exist in other ways, such as its participation in the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

[Question] If the two superpowers are, in your view, devils on the same level, why don't you cooperate with both devils on an equal basis?

[Answer] People take their image of the Kingdom from the American media and other media financed by the United States. These media and those official and unofficial powers which are behind them are eager to say that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has given its blessing to what al-Sadat did in Camp David and supports the Israeli-Egyptian pact. Perhaps if this pact were isolated and did not purport to deal with the Middle East question, the opposition of some Arab states to it would have been less violent, for each state has its sovereignty and independence.

[Question] We only understand Arab sovereignty in one comprehensive framework. No one has a right to deal with one part of the nation without taking into account the will of the rest of the Arabs, or do you not see it that way?

[Answer] When peace with Israel directly threatens Arab interests, no Arab state will accept it.

[Question] This is what the Arabs hope in the final analysis. But it has recently been said that there is a possibility that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on condition that the Soviets agree to the nature of the settlement envisaged by the Saudi initiative. Is this true?

[Answer] I have received no information on this matter. But it is expected. We cannot cut half the world off the political map. Perhaps if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan such relations would have already been established some time ago. Perhaps there was some thought of establishing a kind of balance in the region, and the first state to recognize Saudi rule was the Soviet Union.

Representation among us in the Kingdom was on the level of deputies. Then the minister plenipotentiary was called back to his country, while the employees of the delegation remained in the Kingdom, where they participated in the establishment of the first aeronautics faculty founded by Saudi Arabia. And do not forget that these were Soviet Muslims.

[Question] The only objection raised against the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union, or to put it better, their re-establishment, is the response that the Soviet Union is an atheistic state. Don't you think, Your Excellency, that it is difficult to accuse the United States of being "believing"? Then why not treat them on an equal footing in view of the fact that the two states are both superpowers, and direct dealing with them is necessary?

[Answer] A state, insofar as it is a state, cannot be described as believing or atheistic. Communism believes that religion is an opium, so every communist considers himself an atheist, and is proud of that. The states in Western Europe consider themselves secular, i.e., not believing. The only religious state is the Vatican, and no state stipulates the religion of the state except some of the Arab and Islamic states. Cooperation in international relations does not occur at the level of religion, although we are concerned with religion because we believe in God and because our country is the official center of Islam and the cradle of the apostolic mission.

[Question] Then you do not see any objection to establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union from a religious viewpoint?

[Answer] You must ask the men of religion about the religious viewpoint. We are only speaking of the state. The objection was always that communism uses its principles to do destructive acts in many nations of the world. This is an interference in the domestic affairs of nations, which is not acceptable.

[Question] The United States has admitted in reports from its central intelligence that it disrupted the rule of Yende in Chile and undertook many revolutions in Arab and non-Arab countries and interfered in this way in the Third and non-Third World. So if it is a matter of sending or not sending people to destroy, why don't the states withdraw their recognition of the United States?

[Answer] If U.S. policy has deviated, this will not be stopped by the withdrawal of our recognition of it. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of others.

[Question] And if they interfere in the affairs of sister countries?

[Answer] Our policy is based on few words. We do not grant the United States an advantage over the Soviet Union. We exchange congratulations with them on their national holiday, and they send congratulations to His Royal Highness, and he responds to that. We invite them to our parties, just as they invite us.

[Question] Then there are unofficial relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Yes, and there always have been, though on a nondiplomatic level.

[Question] And today?

[Answer] We must rely on ourselves first of all. This does not mean that we have no need of anyone and refuse to extend our hand to any state that wants our friendship. Our friendship is not based on conditions except mutual respect. We are a state that believes in positive neutrality. We would at times take exception to the positions of some Arab states that are contradictory with regard to their relations to the United States, due to our belief that such positions are unsound. This happened when Egypt supported India in the Kashmir issue, and when it supported Makarios in Cyprus. Egypt's position against Pakistan and Turkey necessitated our position against Egypt.

[Question] Was this done in the name of Islam or in the name of positive neutrality?

[Answer] Islam with positive neutrality. And with the right of self-determination. This right we have supported since 1945 until today, and we of all nations have the fewest words, as I have said, but this does not mean that others have the right to misunderstand us or our policy.

[Question] And on the national level?

[Answer] We are bound to any resolution which we feel we must support, whether on the Arab or Islamic level. If the rumors about the Kingdom were true, it would not have hesitated to support Camp David, for example, or to accept it as a step toward peace. But this is not what happened, and the Kingdom participated in summit conferences and adopted resolutions against Camp David.

[Question] Some have described the recent Saudi initiative as a continuation of Camp David or as a "second Camp David." How does the Kingdom defend itself against this accusation?

[Answer] This is an untrue accusation. To stand against Camp David is to stand against the United States, not just against Israel and the Israeli-Egyptian peace. So how can the initiative be a second Camp David?

[Question] The UN failed to bring about a solution to the Palestinian problem due to the American veto, and Europe failed to be anything but a rear guard for the United States and Israel. So what has happened recently to get the question moving again? Has the Reagan administration discovered a new magic formula?

[Answer] It has discovered a great error in its policy, and that is Camp David itself. And it has discovered the necessity of providing a way out, because Camp David set up a fragmented and emaciated framework for peace in the Middle East and it was not accepted by the Arab world. Even Palestinian self-rule in itself was a mistake. Self-rule is for people, not over territory, so it is not possible that the land belong to Israel and the inhabitants be "Israeli Arabs," in which are included the Palestinians. The basis of the struggle in the occupied territory is the Palestinian problem. This was understood by Europe and

they understood the silly results of Camp David. So if the right of self-determination has any meaning, it is when it is given to all peoples equally. Whether or not America recognizes the Palestinian people, they are a people, and they exist, and they have a weight which can never be denied.

[Question] Does the right of self-determination mean giving a part of Palestinian land to the Palestinians, when the land, all the land, belongs to them, whatever the international resolutions and international balance of power?

[Answer] The problem is that many states have recognized Israel, from the socialist states to the Western and Latin states, and it is not possible to carry out a referendum. Before British Foreign Minister Balfour gave his famous promise, they said, "We will carry out a referendum in Palestine over what form of government the state should take." This referendum would have included all the Jews in the world and all the Arabs in the Arab nation at least.

[Question] Then there is no solution except armed struggle?

[Answer] The Palestinians are responsible for the issue first of all, and Arab world policy has always been that what the Palestinians accept, the rest of the Arabs will accept. There is no alternative to this policy. Liberation in my view is liberation for all, not liberation for some.

[Question] Do you mean the liberation of the Arab nation?

[Answer] I am speaking of the liberation of Palestine. The Arab nation is free.

[Question] And the Palestinians are scattered all over the Arab nation, while Israel is supported by Zionists all over the world and their allies in the Western order. How is it possible for some to take the part of the whole? Is it enough for Yasir 'Arafat to agree to a specific solution for it to be accepted?

[Answer] 'Arafat represents the PLO. He cannot take a single step without the agreement of the PLO. It elected him and placed him in his office. If it bestows on him a particular authorization, that is its prerogative.

[Question] But the PLO, in the final analysis, rises and falls by the agreement of all Palestinians and all Arabs?

[Answer] I think the answer is clear. The future of Palestine is in the hands of the Palestinians. Palestine is Arab, and nobody denies that we are Arabs first.

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IMPLICATIONS OF AIR SKIRMISH DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 209, 23 Nov 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali Qasim: "Is There a Way to Shut Down Arab Air Space in the Face of Repeated Acts of Aggression?"]

[Text] Several days ago, only a few hours after the response of the U.S. Congress to the pressures of President Reagan and his administration with its affirmative vote to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, along with other assorted devices for air battle, Israel committed another act of aggression against a new Arab state that can only be added to a list which seems to grow ever longer. This time the Israeli aggression was not to harass, annihilate or torture the spirits of those who were safe, as has usually happened. Rather, this aggression took a more symbolic and indicative form. The Saudi Ministry of Defense announced, for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle, that Israeli planes violated Saudi air space, necessitating the intervention of Saudi fighter planes in an attempt to resist them. According to the Saudi announcement, the Israeli planes thereupon withdrew, and the matter ended at that--militarily, of course. Politically and in its implications, the problem is much broader. Likewise, its implications will most probably be applied to action, directly and indirectly.

In fact, what the official Saudi report failed to include was frankly revealed by facts about the incident supplied by American military sources, which "leaked" from there to the press and Western media. These sources expressed their lack of surprise that Israel would conduct such an air operation; indeed, on the contrary, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department declared that the Israeli Air Force "has carried out regular reconnaissance missions over Saudi territory for a long time." The spokesman pointed out nonetheless at the same time that the last operation is especially important in view of its timing, which apparently aimed to demonstrate the extent of Israeli disapproval of the U.S. ratification of the Saudi AWACS deal on the one hand, and of what Israeli sources have come to term "the beginning of change" in American political priorities with regard to the Arab region.

Regardless of Israel's hidden and probable goals from the recent reconnaissance flight and other such operations, which are carried out "on a regular basis," according to the American spokesman, over Arab territories, it is certain that these operations, in addition of course to the disgraceful attacks Israel has

carried out from time to time against Arab targets, whether they be Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, and perhaps Saudi in the future, are only further proof of a military and strategic reality which cannot be denied, and the effects of which on Arab national security, its priorities and its interests must not be underestimated.

This reality is, in short, that Israel still enjoys, unfortunately, an air superiority over the surrounding Arab states which permits its fighter planes and reconnaissance planes to fly at liberty over Arab lands and in their skies, without any indications until now that such operations would cost their executors a price that would compel them to review their accounts in fear of retaliation.

The reconnaissance flights undertaken by Israeli planes usually differ to a great extent from the land attack-and-destroy operations which the previously mentioned planes carry out against Arab targets. While these last are usually carried out at extremely low altitudes and at speeds that do not exceed the speed of sound (in view of the difficulty of breaking the speed of sound at low altitudes with planes carrying necessary supplies to carry out attack missions), the reconnaissance flights are mostly undertaken at high and medium-range altitudes (7,000 to 10,000 meters and more, i.e., the equivalent of 25,000 to 30,000 feet and more) and at speeds that are greater than the speed of sound, at times even at twice that speed (approximately 2,300 kilometers an hour). This is because fighter planes which undertake such scouting missions carry only reconnaissance equipment necessary to carry out their operations, such as cameras, electronic sensory, hearing and heating devices, and jumbling and anti-jumbling apparatus, in addition to light defensive weapons, usually limited to machine guns and a pair of air-air missiles. Since these reconnaissance flights take place, as we said, at high and middle-range altitudes, they are easily able to reach their highest operational speeds. But in the case of reconnaissance missions carried out at low altitudes, the performance limitations on the planes are similar to those which apply to low altitude attack missions.

In order to carry out air reconnaissance operations, Israel usually uses reconnaissance fighters of the RF-4 Phantom model. These planes are a model of the F-4 Phantom bomber fighter planes which were built especially to carry out photographic and electronic reconnaissance tasks by being furnished with a complete array of cameras, photographic equipment, heat- and electronically-sensitive apparatus. This was after their power to carry supply and attack weapons was removed, with the exception of the retention of their ability to carry two missiles or four air-air missiles of the Sidewinder or Sparrow models.

The purpose of the Israeli Air Force, by way of example, is to send a couple of these planes to undertake tactical and strategic reconnaissance missions which aim first, to fly deep into Arab lands to observe military movements of a comprehensive nature, such as building main establishments such as air bases, naval bases, or points combining forces, general maneuvers, transportation lines, facilities for economic activity, etc; and second, to observe movements which have a direct bearing in the field, such as the movement of military units, concentration of positions and stockpiles of weapons such as artillery, tanks and missiles...etc. In specific cases Israel sends a single reconnaissance plane accompanied by a fighter plane which is usually of the F-4 Phantom or F-15 Eagle or

Kfir model. In the majority of these operations, reliance is made on two reconnaissance planes accompanied by two fighter planes (and sometimes more--the number of accompanying fighter planes may go up to four to six when expectations indicate an overwhelming possibility of encountering Arab air resistance by means of opposing interceptor planes). The fighter planes are of the F-15 Eagle model, the preferred model in the Israeli Air Force to carry out air surveillance duties in view of its high performance specifications, especially with regard to distance, speed, and ability to maneuver during air entanglements.

Based on all this, it is unlikely that the recent Israeli reconnaissance over Saudi territory, which consisted of a reconnaissance pair of RF-4 Phantom fighters guarded by a formation of four F-15 Eagle fighter planes armed with six anti-aircraft missiles and artillery of a 20-mm caliber and air-air missiles of the Sidewinder and Sparrow models. When Kfir fighter planes of Israeli manufacture are used, the artillery consists of two anti-aircraft guns with a 30-mm caliber and Israeli air-air missiles of the (Shafrir) model.

The first principle which must be emphasized in achieving an active Arab response to such reconnaissance missions (which, though they do not contain the possibility of actual attack on Arab targets, are no less dangerous than attack missions, maybe even more so, in view of the very active role they play in gathering important secret information on Arab military capabilities and plans, uncovering their intentions in advance, with a resulting increase in the extent of Israeli preparedness to face these plans when they occur), is summed up in the necessity of discovering these missions early to ensure a reasonable warning period which would allow interceptor fighter planes to move, take off, and get to the place of the Israeli operation. The use of planes without any other means of aerial obstruction in resisting these operations becomes a factor of utmost importance in view of the nature of their implementation. On the one hand, it is difficult to rely on anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns against planes since these operations take place, as was previously stated, at high and middle-range altitudes which are not reached by the ranges of the aforementioned weapons. On the other hand, it is logical to assume that the Israeli reconnaissance planes will naturally avoid, on their part, flying over areas in which Arab anti-aircraft missiles are operating, in order to avoid the possibilities of confrontation. As a result, the counteracting Arab forces are forced to rely for their part on their interceptor fighter planes, which must be moved by the action of setting up Arab detection and warning systems (long-range land radars, observation and warning planes, airborne radars when they are available, etc.), to discover these planes, their travel and flight patterns, and to inform interceptor fighter plane bases of the necessary coordinates to enable them to take off at the right time to oppose the enemy planes. The importance of early-warning aircraft carriers becomes especially apparent in this area. Their use is limited at the present time to four American planes of the AWACS model which the U.S. Air Force has been using in Saudi Arabia for some time to protect the oil wells there. (And Saudi sources report that the American AWACS did not discover the Israeli planes, since one of the planes was in the air while the reconnaissance operation was being carried out, and this plane was flying over the eastern Saudi region alongside the Arab Gulf, i.e., outside the Israeli flying range.) In addition to these planes, unconfirmed Western sources report that the Syrian Air Force is now using two

Soviet early-warning aircraft of the Tupolev-126 model (known as "Soviet AWACS"). This is since the flaring up of the missile crisis in Lebanon.

As for the interceptor planes themselves, the Arab states have begun at the present time to possess new and effective models, some of which are considered, at least theoretically, to be equal to most types of Israeli fighter planes, and superior to some of them. These types include Soviet-made fighters of the MiG-23 model, which Iraq and Syria both own, and French fighters of the Mirage F-1 model operating now in Iraq and Jordan. This is in addition of course to the MiG-25 fighters originally designed for purposes of intercepting over long distances and high altitudes by means of their superior speed (three times the speed of sound), which is faster than any Israeli plane currently in operation (including the F-15 plane, the speed of which goes up to 2.5 times the speed of sound) and their tremendously high altitudes (24,000 meters, compared with 20,000 meters for the F-15 fighter). These planes are presently operating in both the Iraqi and Syrian Air Forces.

In any case, one thing is necessary: to work to stop Israeli aggression and the freedom of its planes to violate Arab air space and operate in it. These reconnaissance planes are in fact "flying spies," if the expression may be permitted. Since all the states in the world work insofar as is possible to discover enemy spies and to paralyze their activities as a means of eliminating them and protecting national secrets, the region itself calls simply for the application of the same principle with regard to these "flying spies," in order to bring the necessary retribution on them. If this does happen from time to time or even once, Israel may begin to reconsider its acts of aggression before carrying them out. If there are no obstacles of resistance, every possibility remains of further acts of aggression occurring at any time.

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DECREE ESTABLISHES FUNCTIONS OF NEW MINISTRIES

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 25 Nov 81 p 2

[Article: "Presidential Decree No 807 of 1981 Establishing Central Ministries and Defining Their Responsibilities"]

[Text] President General Ja'afar Muhammad Numayri issued Presidential Decree No 807 of 1981 yesterday establishing the central ministries and defining their responsibilities. AL-AYYAM publishes the text of the decree and its attached supplement as follows:

Presidential Decree No 807 of 1981 Establishing the Central Ministries and Defining Their Responsibilities

In the name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate.

President of the Republic.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 90 of the constitution, I hereby issue the following decree:

Rescinded:

1. Presidential Decrees Nos 8 and 218 of 1975, No 1 of 1976, Nos 31 and 147 of 1977, Nos 51, 52, 53, and 344 of 1979, and No 442 of 1980 are hereby rescinded.

Established:

2. The following central ministries are established:

1. Ministry of Defense
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
4. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
5. Ministry of Cooperation, Commerce, and Supply
6. Ministry of Energy and Mining
7. Ministry of Industry
8. Ministry of Transport and Communications
9. Ministry of Education and Guidance

10. Ministry of Construction and Public Works
11. Ministry of Health
12. Ministry of Internal Affairs
13. Office of the Public Prosecutor

Assignment of Responsibilities

3. (1) Each ministry shall carry out the responsibilities assigned to it in the attachment to this decree.
- (2) The Office of the Public Prosecutor shall carry out the responsibilities assigned to it in the Public Prosecutor Law of 1981.

Composition

4. The central ministries shall be composed of the administrations, agencies, and departments belonging to them as of the date of this decision with the exception of the following ministries:

- (1) Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

It shall consist of the following:

- A. The administrations, agencies, and departments that formerly belonged to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy and the Ministry of National Planning.
- B. Office of Services Affairs
- C. Pension Administration
- D. General Audit

- (2) Ministry of Transport and Communications

It shall consist of the following:

- A. The administrations, agencies, and departments which formerly belonged to both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Communications.
- B. Supervision over the organizations which were formerly under the supervision of the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Communications.

- (3) Ministry of Internal Affairs

It shall consist of the following:

- A. The administrations, agencies, and departments belonging to it as of the date of this decree.
- B. Labor Agency
- C. The administrations, agencies, and departments which formerly belonged to the Ministry of Culture and Information.

D. Social Care Agency

E. Supervision over the General Social Security Organization and the Center for the Development of Management and Efficiency in Production.

(4) Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation

It shall consist of the administrations, agencies, and departments which formerly belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Irrigation.

Issued under my signature at the Hall of the People on 28 Muharram 1402 A.H. corresponding to 24 November 1981.

Ja'afar Muhammad Numayri
President of the Republic

Attachment to Presidential Decree No 807 of 1981

1. Ministry of Defense

Responsibilities:

(1) A. To ensure the integrity of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

B. To protect the May Revolution and its socialist achievements.

C. To meet the state's military commitments both regionally and internationally.

D. To participate actively in building and national reconstruction.

E. To work to develop the people's armed forces materially and in terms of human resources and to raise their combat effectiveness.

(2) The agencies and organizations which belong to it shall carry out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with the order by which they were established.

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Responsibilities:

A. To develop political, economic, and cultural cooperation between Sudan and other world states while maintaining mutual respect for national sovereignty and international agreements and conventions.

B. To strive to achieve close relations and regional integration through tactical and strategic policies.

C. To establish relations with all states on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and common benefit.

D. To actively contribute to the struggle against colonialism and racism, uphold the rights of man, and steer the Arab and African liberation movements in this direction.

E. To work to alter the methods and terms of foreign trade for the just welfare of the developing states.

F. To exercise complete control over Sudan's representation abroad and direct foreign affairs activity in the embassies to ensure the coordination of the diverse duties performed by workers in the embassies no matter what their original organizations.

G. To awaken institutions and organizations of the state to the importance of foreign affairs work and its relationship to work at home.

H. To apply foreign policy to serve national interests.

I. To perform any other duties within the scope of its responsibilities as assigned by the president of the republic.

3. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

Responsibilities:

A. To formulate financial and economic policy proposals within the framework of the overall policy of the state.

B. To prepare the state's general budget plan.

C. To formulate general policy proposals regarding foreign currency and credit which will guarantee a sound financial and economic balance and to supervise over the banking system.

D. To direct the movement of public funds and conduct accounting and treasury activities.

E. To supervise insurance and mobilize its resources.

F. To prepare proposals for the 6-year [As Published] and annual national economic and social development plans.

G. To prepare studies pertaining to financial and human resources available for the implementation of the plan in the allotted time in cooperation with other specialized agencies.

H. To develop statistical services for the state, work to modernize statistical methods, and survey the groundwork of scientific planning.

- I. To manage the affairs of individuals and to enumerate, plan, and manage the labor force with a general census of workers in the state.
- J. To prepare wage policy proposals and conduct periodic examinations of the wage structure in the light of surveys of living costs.
- K. To initiate combined lists of workers, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and achieve the permanent relocation of workers to the regions.

4. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation

Responsibilities:

- A. To program agricultural policy in accordance with the plans drawn up by the political authorities.
- B. To develop agricultural, veterinary, and soil conservation guidance.
- C. To carry out crop protection, combat agricultural pests, and oversee the monitoring and certification of improved seed.
- D. To develop veterinary services, improve animal health, and conduct theoretical and applied research in the fields of agriculture and animal health.
- E. To raise agricultural and animal production and develop pastures, woods, and surface and ground water resources.
- F. To test and certify industrial and agricultural machinery and equipment.
- G. To develop and improve agricultural production in the national projects, to develop and improve national horticultural yields, and to upgrade traditional agriculture.
- H. To develop and improve marketing services for cattle and meats.
- I. To conduct the training and qualification of work cadres in the fields of agriculture, food, and natural resources.
- J. To develop and improve existing services for continuous irrigation from the Nile and its tributaries and to maintain the associated installations.
- K. To provide additional continuous water sources to meet the needs of agricultural development and to work to improve means of irrigation from the Nile and its tributaries as well as other permanent sources.
- L. To work to utilize Sudan's share of Nile water to continue studies to achieve an increase in the benefit derived from the Nile.
- M. To supervise the institutions and organizations working in the field of irrigation.

N. To train technical cadres in the field of irrigation.

O. To initiate combined lists of workers, to reinforce the regions with an appropriate number of workers, and to work to relocate workers permanently to the regions.

5. Ministry of Cooperation, Commerce, and Supply

Responsibilities:

A. To formulate the policy of the ministry in support of the cooperation movement within the framework of the general policy of the state.

B. To work to foster and guide the cooperation movement.

C. To foster international relations in the field of cooperation.

D. To regulate and direct import and export operations, to expand mutual trade operations, and to act to make consumer products available.

E. To supervise public organizations working in the import-export field as well as concession companies.

F. To strengthen international and regional cooperation.

G. To survey and quantify consumer needs and set the shares of basic goods for the regions.

H. To supervise standards for weights and measures.

I. To train technical cadres in the field of cooperation, commerce, and supply.

J. To initiate combined lists of workers, to reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and to gradually relocate these workers to the regions on a permanent basis with the provision that the necessary number of cooperation officers shall be relocated immediately.

6. Ministry of Energy and Mining

Responsibilities:

A. To conduct a complete geological survey of Sudan's soil and territorial waters with the aim of exploiting and developing mineral resources.

B. To conduct research in the field of mineral resources.

C. To conduct technical and vocational training in all fields of mining with special attention to mid-level cadres and to prepare highly qualified cadres in energy-related fields.

D. To supervise research in energy-related fields and to work to provide the necessary sources of energy to fill the country's present and future needs.

E. To supervise the institutions and organizations working in the fields of energy and mining.

F. To initiate unified lists of workers, reinforce the regions with proper numbers of workers, and take action aimed at relocating these workers permanently to the regions.

7. Ministry of Industry

Responsibilities:

A. To improve the standard of production and advancement in existing industries.

B. To encourage industrialization in the field of basic consumer goods to meet local demand and export needs.

C. To formulate programs for the modernization and development of traditional industries in the rural areas in order to achieve the desired equivalency in the economic and social fields.

D. To conduct research on industry-related problems and formulate solutions for these problems.

E. To conduct technical and vocational training in all fields of industry with particular attention to mid-level cadres.

F. To initiate a combined list of workers.

8. Ministry of Transport and Communications

Responsibilities:

A. To link the country with overland, river, and air transportation networks and to utilize these networks in the service of the economy.

B. To further develop the means of transport, increase their efficiency, and remedy any areas of inadequacy in them.

C. To formulate programs to establish main roads within Sudan and between Sudan and its neighbors and to supervise the implementation of these programs.

D. To raise the efficiency of telephone and telegraph communications.

E. To improve and develop postal services.

F. To implement radio and wire communications with neighboring states and other states with maximum utilization of technological innovations in this field and the assistance of international and regional organizations.

G. To raise the level of engineering, managerial, and technical performance in all facilities of the ministry through ongoing training, especially with regard to the mid-level and assistant-level cadres.

H. To initiate combined lists of workers, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and achieve the gradual relocation of these workers to the regions on a permanent basis.

9. Ministry of Education and Guidance

Responsibilities:

A. To formulate education policy, plans, and programs within the framework of the general policy of the state and to prepare academic curricula.

B. To supervise higher education and technical and technological institutes.

C. To train qualified technical cadres of teachers in accordance with education plans, programs, and goals.

D. To initiate combined lists of workers in the field of education, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and achieve the permanent relocation of these workers to the regions with the provision that elementary school teachers of both sexes shall be relocated to the regions immediately leaving an appropriate number of such teachers for Khartoum Province.

10. Ministry of Construction and Public Works

Responsibilities:

A. To formulate public policy pertaining to construction, buildings, development planning, and housing within the framework of the general policy of the state.

B. To supervise the lands belonging to the central government and formulate the principles according to which these lands shall be administered.

C. To train technical cadres in the field of construction and public works.

D. To initiate unified lists of workers, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and achieve the gradual relocation of these workers to the regions on a permanent basis.

11. Ministry of Internal Affairs

Responsibilities:

A. To initiate a unified list of prison officers, firefighting officers, and wildlife protection officers and to supervise their affairs including their appointment, training, assignments, allowances, and promotions.

B. To administer passports, emigration, and citizenship.

- C. To protect wildlife resources.
- D. To supervise the Border Administration and the Refugees Administration.
- E. To supervise the Central Documents Depository, the Land Survey Agency, the Government Printing Office, and the Labor Agency.
- F. To formulate public policy regarding culture.
- G. To foster motherhood and childhood and care for the disabled and the handicapped and to exercise general supervision over social institutions.
- H. To train the necessary cadres to carry out its duties in the field of culture, labor, and social care.
- I. To initiate a combined list of workers, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of workers, and initiate action to relocate them permanently to the regions.

12. Ministry of Health:

Responsibilities:

- A. To formulate public policy in the fields of environmental, preventive, therapeutic, and occupational health within the framework of the general policy of the state.
- B. To endeavor to train and qualify cadres to work in the health field.
- C. To initiate combined lists of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, and assisting cadres, reinforce the regions with appropriate numbers of these workers, and achieve the gradual relocation of these workers to the regions on a permanent basis.

13. Public Prosecutor

Responsibilities:

The public prosecutor shall carry out the responsibilities stipulated in the Public Prosecutor Law of 1981.

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CSO: 4504/125

REFORM MEASURES ANALYZED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 30 Nov 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Political Reform and Self-Control"]

[Text] Yesterday, we touched on the challenges before us in the phase of self-mastery as characterized and explained by the president in his detailed address 2 days ago before the joint meeting of political office members and ministers. We also put forward our view of what is required of us both as leaders and as rank-and-file to make the economic restoration program successful as a first step.

This makes apparent the important, serious, and necessary role of the sole political organization through its various subsidiary organizations. First, through the mass organizations active in all inhabited areas which must strive with conviction, magnanimity, and impartiality to broaden their base. Second, through the group organizations which must abandon their desperate struggle to attain rights without duties and to gain improvement in the conditions of service without endeavoring to discover the means and methods that will ensure that the wheels of production continue to turn. Third, through the labor groups which, based on their founding principles and conditions of membership, do not differentiate between the minister and the guard at the same ministry except through democratic selection. These labor groups are expected to function as crucibles in which opinions and ideas react with one another on the way to the formulation of a single program, not as instruments in a conflict over which individual has the greatest claim to leadership--the trade union or labor group?

At this point, we interpose the explanation offered by the president in his speech of 2 days ago. In this speech, he pointed out that the most important feature of the new changes in the cabinet is the fact that some former ministers who are political office members have now become free to devote themselves to their work within the sole political organization. As the president pointed out, this necessarily means the bolstering and vitalization of the sole political organization so that it may assume its pioneering role in leading the national work and mobilizing the masses of the forces of alliance.

We are certain that this freedom will give these leaders the opportunity to rectify the course of performance in a way that will eliminate duplication in the production, implementation, and monitoring of decisions considering that it is the political organization which directs the course of the national work without

assuming or carrying out the duties of the government organizations in place of them. Or, as stated in the constitution of the Sudanese Socialist Federation, it is a ruling organization, not an organization of government.

During its coming phase, the political organization should work to further the progress of the executive organization without entering into any sensitivities or friction with it. Integration, patience, and consultation are all desirable things. Criticism is also desirable, but this criticism should originate from the standpoint of presenting a practical alternative and showing a willingness to participate in the proposed solution.

We have continued to hear at widely separated intervals about some conflicting concepts between the executive and political branches based on the generation of some causative factors behind group crises and problems and attempts on the part of each side to criticize the role of the other. Perhaps the phase of self-control and the program of economic revitalization require that all steps come together and move in one harmonious cadence toward the solution which will end the suffering of the citizens, confirm the capability of the political organization in deed as well as words, raise slogans, and cause cheers to break forth. We mention here what the president has stated in his recent remarks to the effect that nations will not be built by complainers and the unemployed. The foremost hope is that the political organization will prepare to embark on its prodigious tasks--though the way ahead is long--so that it can perform them in the desired form and manner.

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SUDAN

BRIEFS

SSU COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA--Dr 'Awn al-Sharif Qasim, member of the Political Office and deputy secretary of the Office of Political Affairs and Organizations, recently visited Romania within the framework of cooperation between the Sudanese Socialist Federation and the Romanian Communist Party. During the 1-week trip, Dr Qasim visited the Academy of Socialist Studies in Bucharest where he discussed aspects of cooperation between the academy and the Institute of Socialist Research and Studies with the academy administration. He also met with Josef Banc, member of the central committee and head of the Romanian side on the Joint Committee for Political and Economic Cooperation between Sudan and Romania. The conversation between the two men dealt with various aspects of political cooperation between the two organizations. From Romania, Dr 'Awn traveled to Tunis where he took part in the Planning Conference for International Cooperation for the Development of Islamic Arab Culture. The conference was held by the Arab Organization for Culture and the Sciences from 10 to 13 November. It issued resolutions pertaining to the establishment of intellectual and administrative organizations to ensure the spread of Arab and Islamic culture within the Arab countries and abroad. [Text] [Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 24 Nov 81 p 1] 8591

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FLAWS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL DISCUSSED

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Feb 82 pp 7-10

[Article by university economics instructors Abdeljelil Bedoui and Khaled el Manoubi]

[Text] The thoughts we are presenting in this document fall within the framework of a study we started a year ago¹ involving analysis of the growth model and its impact on the structure of relations between social partners. The object of the present stage of reflection is not to reexamine the main outlines of the analysis already made. Its purpose is simply to make a critical evaluation of the elements present in the guidelines underlying the drafting of the Sixth Plan in this third decade of development.²

For that purpose, we will begin by recalling the main conclusions reached by us in our first study, after which we will attempt to examine the extent to which the new guidelines provide solutions to the various contradictions and obstacles uncovered during our analysis of the growth model for the 1970's.

Like the one before it, this investigation is concerned with examining the three chief variables, which are wages, prices and employment. Those variables determine the configuration of relations between social partners.

It should be noted that the conclusions to be reviewed by us here are obviously connected with the problematics adopted for our first study--that is, the analysis of the growth model's impact on relations between social partners. That first study was made in two stages. The first consisted of revealing the basically dependent and outward-oriented, or "extroverted," nature of the Tunisian economy. The second involved an examination of the effect of those two characteristics on both the formation and the status of those three variables--prices, wages, and employment--which constitute the socioeconomic stake for the "social partners."

Dependence and Outward Orientation

The essential feature of the Tunisian economy is the upstream dependence of its production, as characterized by the almost systematic recourse (due to the absence of structure and of a dynamic of innovation and invention) both to foreign technology,

which is provided mainly by the dominant capitalist countries, and to the foreign financing necessary for installing the production capacities implied by the adoption of those technologies. This phenomenon, which is becoming considerably more extensive and worsening from one decade to the next, can be grasped in several ways. It is noted, for example, that:

1. The percentage of imported finished capital goods rose from 76 percent for the 5 years from 1964 to 1969 to 95 percent for the 5-year period from 1970 to 1975.
2. During the 1972-1978 period, total imports increased at an average rate of 25 percent, while inputs (capital goods, raw materials, semifinished products, and energy) rose by more than 27 percent.
3. More serious is the diverging development noted in the GDP, imports, and exports during the decade (1972-1981). Imports rose at a rate of 12 percent, compared to only 7.3 percent for the GDP, while exports rose by only 8.1 percent (that is, more slowly than imports), thus worsening the trade deficit and requiring greater recourse to external financing.
4. External financing rose from an annual average of 65.4 million dinars during the period from 1972 to 1976 to 226 million dinars for the period from 1977 to 1981, meaning that it more than tripled in current terms and almost doubled in real terms. This obviously worsened the rate of indebtedness (total debt), which during the same period rose from an average of 31 percent to an average of 39 percent.

The result of that dependent characteristic has been a certain special status for the wage variable, which is the only variable in the cost structure for capitalists that is subject to control. It thus acquires the status of a cost that one seeks to curb rather than an income that one tries to increase as a way of dynamizing the economy. Its status has been strengthened by the fact that it has taken on a rigid and structural character with the worsening of the process of extroversion--the product of a contradictory dynamic resulting from our upstream dependence. This pronounced tendency toward extroversion is irrefutable if we examine a few figures.

a) While the GDP at current market prices rose at an average annual rate of 15.3 percent between 1971 and 1981, exports of goods and services rose at the higher rate of 20.8 percent.

b) The result is a structural change of considerable extent, since the share of exports of goods and services in the GDP at market prices rose from an average of 20 percent for the decade from 1961 to 1970 to an average of 35 percent for the decade from 1971 to 1980.

Effects of Dependence and Extroversion on Variables and Social Relations

a) Wages: Considering the cost status assigned to wages in this extroverted dynamic of the economy, the development of this class of income has been the constant object of a policy aimed at keeping it within narrow limits, as is shown by the following.

Since 1970, the agricultural guaranteed minimum wage has risen at an average annual rate of 4.6 percent, while the same figure for the interoccupational guaranteed

minimum wage is 5.1 percent. Both rates are lower than the per capita growth rate of 5.7 percent (in real terms) for the GDP.

The most significant figure, however, is the growth rate for the average wage, which stands at 3.4 percent, or nearly half the growth rate for the per capita GDP.

This development has been reflected in a concentration of income to the detriment of the wage earners, whose share of the GDP declined from 43 percent in 1970 to 36 percent in 1978. Those results should be qualified, however, by noting that the deflator on which they are based is a price index which is the object of a great deal of justified criticism and which results in greatly overestimated gains. This idea is corroborated by the results obtained if one uses the same deflator as that adopted for the national accounts, which gives us a quite low increase in the average wage.³ It must also be noted that this structure of the distribution of income is quite specific to underdeveloped economies, especially those that are most outward oriented. In the developed countries, where wages are regarded basically as income, the share of wages in the added value is constantly stable at an appreciable level that fluctuates at around 75 percent. In any case, the lesson that can be learned within the framework of the problematics we have adopted is that this model of extroverted dependent growth, which makes wages a cost, prevents any serious consideration of compromise and dialogue between the social partners, one of which (the wage earner) regards this category (wages) as a chief variable for his reproduction, and he consequently seeks constantly to improve it, while the other partner (the capitalist) seeks absolutely to contain it so as to reproduce himself in an expanded manner on the extroverted base.

b) Prices: The concentration of income has been reflected in a certain dynamic for the allocation of resources in the direction of industries benefiting from solvent domestic or foreign demand to the detriment of industries producing food goods. As a result, the production of essential foodstuffs--cereals and oil, for example--has less than doubled over the past 15 years, while fruit and vegetable production is well over double what it was 15 years ago. The result is a growing deficit in essential items, which have been increasingly imported at constantly increasing prices since 1973 from a world market controlled by large capitalist firms. Only increasingly massive government intervention through the Equalization Fund has prevented prices from getting out of control. But that fund's limits were quickly reached, with the result that the government can no longer control developments in the cost of living (as witness the recent spate of price increases in essential goods and services), and this will certainly sharpen the disagreements between the social partners.

c) Employment: The outward-oriented growth model has made the choice of technologies compulsory, because there is no alternative in the absence of local production of capital goods. And it is also necessary in an economy that is extroverted in the downstream direction and must guarantee the quality standards of its products, especially those sold on the international market, since this requires that upstream technical standards be adopted. The result has been the use of increasingly capitalistic technologies that rule out the absorption of available manpower and cause tension on the labor market, which is characterized by the presence of nearly 400,000 unemployed and 500,000 underemployed. This situation obviously strengthens the position of the capitalist partner in negotiations, since he is unwilling to pay the

work force more than the market price. As far as the government is concerned, it uses that situation to moderate the demands of the wage earners on the pretext of being concerned primarily with those who have no income at all, as though the inability to create enough jobs were not due to the growth model chosen by the government and the employers.

It is now appropriate to consider the extent to which the new guidelines for the 1980's will remove those contradictions and obstacles. We will do so within the problematical framework we chose at the beginning, which is aimed at an analysis of the links existing between the economic choices and the relations between social partners.

Critical Evaluation of This Decade's Chief Guidelines

In this part of our paper, we will begin by attempting to analyze the extent to which the announced new guidelines indicate a break with or, on the contrary, a continuation of dependence, extroversion, and the strengthening of capitalist relationships generating inequalities. After that, we will attempt in the second part of this paper to consider the implications of the conclusions arrived at concerning the development of wages, prices and employment and, beyond that, the configuration of relations between social partners. The latter is important not only to the working class: it also foreshadows the nature of the social climate, the improvement of which is called for by the planners themselves as a condition for proper execution of the Sixth Plan. The problem thus presenting itself is that of whether the pattern established by technicians and economists gives reason to hope that relations between social partners will be restructured in the direction of improvement.

An attentive reading of the various official papers for orientation and preparation leads to one obvious fact: the growth model adopted to date is doubly accepted, since not only is it supposed to have made substantial progress possible from one decade to the next in basic areas (growth of production, employment and investment, a reduction in foreign debt, and so on), but in addition, it will supposedly be able to place us "at the level of the developed nations in the year 2000." From that standpoint, the imperatives of continuity take clear precedence over those of change, which, while they frequently appear in the official documents, are actually concerned only with formal rectifications. The essence of the preceding model has been retained as regards dependence, extroversion, and the strengthening of capitalist relationships, which are at no time called into question--quite the contrary.

a) Dependence: It must be noted that dependence is not discussed as such, with the result that the official documents do not even try to remedy it. From that standpoint, our criticisms may appear severe, since what is at stake visibly escapes the authors of those documents. But it is manifestly true that the stake is a considerable one. As we have seen, an economy that does not have a sector for the production of capital goods is not only incapable of affecting all elements of the cost structure (equipment, products, semifinished products, raw materials, wages, and so on), but by that very fact deprives itself of the mainspring of its economic dynamic and thus of its destiny. In such a case, it is useless to speak, as the official documents do, of an integration of the economy and, more particularly, of the production apparatus. That is why the orientation paper, for example, is not even capable of giving conceptual and operative coherence to the notion of integration.

It winds up by acknowledging the need to continue importing capital goods and semi-finished products, with the one exception that it does contemplate the manufacture of local substitutes for a few components of the technological packages that will still be imported.

Even from that limited angle, it must be wondered whether the Tunisian economy must absolutely adopt the technological model bequeathed to us by the dominant countries within the limits of sacrosanct profitability calculated by reference to international prices--considering that a few pages further on, that same (capitalistic) technology is said to be responsible for the limits encountered in the matter of creating jobs.

The integration that is spoken of is in fact integration with the capitalist world market (rather than industrial integration) through the process of filling slots such as the mechanical and electrical engineering industries, which are being rejected by the capitalistic centers--for the same reason that, for example, they rejected the textile industries, whose fate since 1977 is well known.

While industrial integration in the spirit of the various official documents refers in the final analysis to strengthening the Tunisian economy's ties with the capitalist world market, it should be noted that integration between agriculture and industry is not even hinted at in the proposals.

What is more, Tunisia is offering to serve the "EEC," the "other European countries," and "also the United States" as an "industrial base" in the sense of a free zone and is committing itself in advance to orient "its foreign policy in that direction" and to organize "its diplomacy accordingly."

b) Outward Orientation: The orientation paper considers "that it is imperative for the harmonious and balanced development of the Tunisian economy to speed up the growth rate of exports and to reduce the trade deficit." Extroversion is seen as an essential and necessary condition for any "harmonious" and "balanced" development. What is being presented as an imperative is actually only the inescapable result of the disjointed and dependent growth model. How can one avoid being led--and what is more, constrained--to contemplate the growth of exports when one has accepted as inevitable the continued importing of capital goods and other products on the one hand, and when, on the other hand, one is banking on a strong growth which will involve more imports? It is clear, then, that with very strong growth in imports, attempting simply to contain the deficit in the trade balance--even relatively--demands a breathless race to export. So it appears that what is being presented as technically the sole and inescapable solution is in fact only an implicit and therefore commonplace--but very dangerous--consequence of the dependent model that has been adopted, and one that is, of course, foreign to the announced concern to seek harmony and balance.

But beyond these preliminary considerations, it is also useful to know which sectors may participate actively in increasing the rhythm of the necessary exports in this dependent model. The impression one gets from reading the official documents is one of perplexity and distress at the exhaustion of a few sectors and the poor ability to identify export channels. As presented from the standpoint of extroversion, the current situation is hardly a brilliant one: our textile industry is hemmed in by the quotas set by a Common Market that is increasingly protectionist in these times

of crisis, our petroleum income is melting away as the years go by, and our agriculture cannot find an adequate foothold in a Common Market with nine members--and the prospect of its extension to include Greece, Spain and Portugal hardly indicates that the future will be better. So two paths present uncertain prospects:

First, the search for new slots that we can fill in keeping with the new international division of labor being proposed by the capitalistic centers--that is, the mechanical and electrical engineering industries.

And second, the search for new markets, especially in the Arab world and essentially in an industry such as building materials. It is understandable, then, that the ultimate recourse for increasing exports should be found in an industry described as presenting no risks: tourism. But there, too, the uncertainties are far from being cleared away if one considers the unemployment, inflation, and drop in real wages occurring in the countries that traditionally supply us with tourists.

c) Strengthening of capitalist relations: In the face of those uncertainties and the situation of crisis, it is disturbing at the very least to see the government contemplating a greater shift away from the productive sector to the private sector and private enterprise. The latter already finds it difficult to operate actively in a period of expansion (except when it comes to speculation and easy profits), and it is more than probable that it is in no position to face a situation of recession. Moreover, private enterprise can no longer rely as before on direct government support. From now on, instead, it will have another "protector" which will be none other than the financial sector dominated by international financial capital. One might as well admit that the "decisive" but selective subsidies that the government intends to grant to private firms in place of the various indirect incentives now in effect will be sucked up by a "rigorous" financial system greedy for profitability and little concerned with the creation of jobs, decentralization, or other objectives said to be matters of government concern. It should also be recalled that the cooperatives, free at last "of egalitarian demagoguery," and the state-owned firms, which from now on will be subject to supervision consisting of nothing more than approval of their budgets, are being asked to submit to control by financial capital and are doomed to open up their cashboxes to it in the name of efficiency and profitability. Thus pulverized and transformed into satellites by financial capital, the state-owned firms will then be able to attract the good managers they now lack because the civil service cannot, either now or in the foreseeable future, attract them with the low salaries paid to government employees (sic). Such talk revives a simplistic but dominant kind of thinking which says that underdevelopment is a lag characterized by the absence of an elite of entrepreneurs--of good managers--capable of identifying profitable projects and rationally managing the enterprises established. But how does one avoid reviving the tradition that consists of beginning each decade with a vast reorganization plan financed by capital grants as a consequence of the bureaucratic management of those institutions which tend to be classed as beylics by the technobureaucracy that manages them? It must be said that instead of stimulating the government to consider a radical reform of the state-owned firms aimed at eradicating the bureaucratic evil at its root, the current crisis in public finance seems to be leading it to hand the public sector over to financial capital on a silver platter. Let us make it clear that the prime minister's speech presenting the 1982 budget leaves room for little doubt on that score.

All things considered, and beyond the technical talk and the socialist-tinged phraseology, the coming decade offers us basically a strengthening of dependence, extroversion, and expansion of the capitalist relations of production, but with more uncertainty as to the pursuit of growth itself. In these conditions, one wonders whether one can seriously hope for an improved social climate, which is presented by the authors of the official documents as necessary for achieving the objectives of the Sixth Plan. What such improvement involves is relations between social partners that can lead to dialogue and concessions, essentially at the three levels constituting the stake in those relations: wages, prices and employment. But as we indicated in our first study and repeated in the first part of this document, it is forbidden and useless to think about any improvement in those relations in a dependent and outward-oriented economy. Thus the conclusions concerning the status and situation of wages, prices and employment remain basically the same, except that a deterioration is always possible. Nevertheless, in the following section we will review the analysis of those three levels, not to present their status and situation but to discuss the meaning and internal consistency of the measures which the various official documents contemplate adopting in the areas of wages, prices and employment during the Sixth Plan.

Wages, Prices, and Employment

1. Wages: In the orientation paper, the authors are fond of stressing, "out of a concern for objectivity," the worsening of social disparities while expressing a determination at the verbal level to combat them. But the entire model chosen, which is nothing but a continuation of the model for the 1970's, and the measures contemplated at the sectoral level rule out all possibility of achieving the assigned objective. This is because the model, as we have analyzed it above, remains basically one of dependence and extroversion, with the result that the status of wages is not destined to know a new fate. They will continue to be regarded as a cost which capitalism will seek to reduce, partly to maintain an acceptable profit level despite the effects of the heavy burden resulting from upstream dependence and partly to improve its competitive position on the international market, which is a necessity in this chiefly extroverted model.

In addition, the wage measures mentioned in the orientation paper are characterized by three features:

First, while there is talk of wage increases, there is scarcely an explicit intention to do more than safeguard purchasing power (in other words, to maintain wages at real levels). From a certain standpoint, the consistency with the model is perfect, but the gap in terms of what is said is obvious.

Second, as part of a strategy for decentralizing social conflicts, there is the express intention, with a view to dividing the working class, to move toward sectoral disparities and disparities between firms in the matter of wages. From the standpoint merely of maintaining purchasing power, this will necessarily be reflected in a deterioration of purchasing power for one sector of the working class.

Third, that last conclusion is corroborated by the objective--indispensable to the balance of the model--of reducing the growth in per capita consumption. The growth in per capita consumption during the 1970's was more rapid than the growth of the

per capita GDP, which increased at a rate almost double that of per capita wages deflated using the questionable official cost-of-living index. This shows that the growth in per capita consumption is due to spending by nonwage earners. Considering that the latter are not the object of any particular measures aimed at reducing their consumption (see the chapter on taxes in the official documents), it goes without saying that the objective of reducing per capita consumption--necessary for equilibrium--will inescapably mean a reduction in the growth rate of consumption for the wage earners, and this will inevitably require a reduction of their purchasing power. So the sacrifices that are mentioned as necessary for "combating underdevelopment and lifting ourselves to the same level as Spain," which is considered the target model, are being demanded exclusively of the working class.

From the standpoint of maintaining or even producing a slight and problematical increase in the purchasing power of the wage earners, the contemplated strong growth of the GDP in real terms (despite the minor downward adjustments introduced by the 1982 budget by reason of the model's extreme fragility) can only be reflected in a worsening of disparities in the distribution of income.

In addition to the fact that the fruits of growth will continue to be cornered by nonwage earners, the increased concentration of income can only reinforce extroversion and move social dynamics in the direction of an exacerbated situation of conflict.

2. Prices: We have already noted how the development of agriculture has been marked by a falling off of the share of food products in agricultural production, which is being directed increasingly toward exports or toward solvent demand from the moneyed classes that have benefited from the concentration of income. This development has resulted in the increasing presence of imported products in the working class's consumer basket, and the price of such products is beyond the government's control. The government merely submits to the increase in the price of imported agricultural products and thus has not been able to deal with it in such a way as to mitigate its effects or hold wage increases within limits meeting the requirements of the extroverted growth model except by recourse to the famous Equalization Fund. But that fund is a two-edged instrument. At first, and within tolerable limits, it could be used to squeeze wages--viewed as a cost that must be reduced by any means so that an economy which sells 35 percent of its GDP abroad can hang on as best it can to the foreign market. But now that the fund has spent 157 million dinars and accumulated a deficit of 150 million dinars subsidized by the budget, it poses the problem not only of that fund's financing sources but also of the amount of its expenditures, which, by becoming very high, amounts to a diversion of available funds from productive to nonproductive use. This will certainly either affect the rate of growth or increase our recourse to foreign assistance and thus put the country farther in debt. This is a dilemma that cannot possibly be settled one way or another. It is not a matter of abolishing or retaining the fund. Its abolition cannot possibly be seriously contemplated in a dependent and outward-oriented model that exercises less and less control over the reproduction of its work force. The problem is therefore posed in different terms: since abolishing the fund and simply maintaining it are equally impossible, we are brought back to the question of how far its level of intervention must be cut back without shaking the very foundations of this fragile model.

The government therefore finds itself on a veritable razor's edge and cannot, in any best of cases, contemplate more than maintaining a purchasing power which alone

might have some chance of being compatible with the logic of the model and with the constraints of bookkeeping equilibrium. It can immediately be seen that as a result of the inescapable reduction in the fund's total expenditures, price rises are being contemplated in advance. This is forcing the government to announce nominal wage increases in advance, and not without some triumphalism, as if those wage increases are preceding, or will precede, the price rises or as if it can do more than compensate, more or less partially, for their effects.

The fact remains, nevertheless, that as far as incomes are concerned, the fund's redistributive effect is considerably negative and biased in the direction of a worsening of inequalities. From that standpoint, its abolition is imperative and represents a legitimate demand. The only problem is that its abolition can only be carried out within the framework of a sharper reorientation of the accumulation model in the direction of greater autonomy in reproducing the system, including in particular greater control over all components of the cost structure, and thus in the direction of reduced extroversion.

3. Employment: It must be noted that on the verbal level, employment has always constituted the first priority.

But the words no longer deal with the same subject matter, even though the situation itself remains unchanged.

In reality, we have witnessed the following gradual process:

The proclaimed objective at first was to wipe out unemployment completely by absorbing both the additional manpower entering the job market and the inherited backlog of unemployed.

But the procedures that were implemented reached their limit very quickly, leading the authorities in a second phase to abandon the idea of absorbing the backlog of unemployed and underemployed and to contemplate only the full employment of additional manpower. Among the methods used, however, was the planned emigration of manpower.

In the third phase, and because of the growing obstacles in the growth model adopted, it was felt necessary to maintain the above-mentioned objective by manipulating statistics so as to exclude young people between 15 and 18 years of age and older people between the ages of 60 and 64 from the active population--thus flying in the face of all reality.

Lastly--in the fourth phase--the idea of achieving the objective of full employment for the additional manpower was purely and simply abandoned, and it was proclaimed impossible to achieve it despite constant recourse to officially (and haphazardly organized) emigration. Without much confidence, an attempt is being made to replace the notion of employment with that of "source of income" within the unfamiliar framework of small-scale production or the so-called nonstructured sector.

Consequently, it is hard to understand why, at the same time, we are being assured with a great deal of fanfare that all that remains for the country is to mop up the last pockets of poverty, and then the joy of living will be guaranteed for all.

However, and in order to avoid being too severe, one must give the orientation paper credit for indicating awareness of the obvious but intrinsic limits of the model, which excludes the possibility of contemplating full employment even for the additional population alone. Unfortunately, the orientation paper's merit in doing so seems very relative when one takes into account its proposed explanations for the unemployment problem. Basically, the paper attributes failure to master the unemployment problem to natural causes (population growth) and institutional causes (the poor ability to identify projects, the inadequacies of the financial system, the relative ineffectiveness of indirect advantages (taxes and so on), the sluggishness of administrative channels, and so on). On this subject, it is impossible to repeat too often that the problem of employment and unemployment is an endogenous element in both the accumulation model and, more particularly, its socioeconomic determinations.

In the final analysis, the problem of employment leads us back to the choice of technologies and industries and to the productive system's degree of integration, all of which must be chosen so as to make the socioeconomic dynamic endogenous--the only means of achieving full employment.

In this connection, it should be mentioned that reform of the educational system--which has been the subject of discussion for 15 years without being put into effect--is ineffectual and useless as long as simultaneously with that reform, we do not contemplate a transformation of the productive system to provide education with a goal and dynamize accumulation. Such action can make no sense until the break is consummated with the current lack of correspondence between an educational system that has been imported in its main outlines and a productive system that is essentially dominated and therefore uncommon.

Lastly, we must remark on the limited consequences and minor impact that can be expected from the measures contemplated in connection with employment. Plans call for increasing the interest rate on long-term credits to discourage capitalistic projects, while it has also been decided to change the assessment basis for employer contributions to the CNSS [National Committee for Social Solidarity]. That basis will now be the added value rather than total payroll--which, in the opinion of the authors of the official documents, discourages employment.

However, in an extroverted economy which must respect foreign consumer norms when it manufactures products for export, the range of technical choices is very limited.

The reason is that in the final analysis, respect for consumer norms sends us back to the adoption of technical norms involving the importation of the capitalist technologies adopted by our competitors, either in part or in full. The result is that neither a credit policy nor a contribution policy can seriously influence technological choices as long as the economy is dependent and outward-oriented.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the prospects for the coming decade indicate a continuation of the growth model adopted for the 1970's, except for a few adjustments which cannot result in any significant correction of that model and which will necessarily worsen and reinforce the situation of conflict between the social partners, and this can only result in a deterioration of the social climate.

That is why we feel that a restructuring of relations between social partners must necessarily be preceded by reflection concerning the growth model itself--reflection aimed at challenging that model.

With that in mind, we will attempt in a future edition to outline a few ideas which might help to change the current growth model and which will be of a nature to improve the situation of the working class in the medium term.

FOOTNOTES

1. See our study entitled "Growth Model and Relations Between Social Partners in Tunisia," DEMOCRATIE, October 1980.
2. In preparing this study, we based our work on the orientation and preparation documents for the third decade of development, in particular:
 - a) "Orientation Paper for the Third Decade of Development and the Sixth Plan" (October 1981).
 - b) The various papers to correct the original scenario that were issued by the Ministry of Finance and Plan in June-July 1981.
 - c) The prime minister's speech presenting the state budget for 1982, which is the first year of the Sixth Plan.
3. Thus deflated, the average wage rose by only 2.3 percent from 1961 to 1978 and by 2.5 percent from 1970 to 1978, while the GDP at factor cost rose by 6 percent from 1961 and 1978 and by nearly 7 percent from 1970 to 1978. The interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage rose by only 1.2 percent between 1961 and 1978.

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CSO: 4519/116

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

PER CAPITA INCOME--The gross per capita income in the United Arab Emirates reached 75,000 UAE Dirham at the end of 1980, according to statistics released last week by officials at the Planning Industry. The figure showed that the final per capita consumption has reached 29,800 Dh. while the average allocation of imports reached 32,800 dirham. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 655, 12 Feb 82 p 13]

OIL COAL PROJECT--Authorities in Abu Dhabi approved late last week a 200-million dollar oil coal project. An official said that the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultancy plans to conduct scientific studies related to this project. This phase demands the assistance of technical expertise, he added. A feasibility study carried out by Kellogg Consultant Incorporated showed the viability of the project. It is expected that this initiative will produce 160,000 tonnes of coal annually from precipitate in the Ruweis refinery of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), the official said. In further statements he added that a meeting of representatives of aluminum companies in the region will be called shortly to discuss the logistics of future oil coal supplies to Gulf smelters. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 655, 12 Feb 82 p 17]

CSO: 4400/149

SAHARA PEACE PLAN FOUNDERS

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 p 5

[Text]

AN AFRICAN peace plan for ending the Western Saharan war fell flat in Nairobi last week when Morocco refused to sit down at the negotiating table with Polisario guerrillas.

As a result, the seven-nation committee of 'Sages' set up by the OAU failed even to reach the first step towards peace: a ceasefire in the six-year-old conflict between Morocco, which administers the Western Sahara, and the Polisario guerrillas, backed by Algeria and Libya, who are battling for the independence of the desert territory.

After two packed days of talks in Nairobi, the committee issued a step-by-step, detailed proposal for peace in the Western Sahara, once a Spanish colony that subsisted on phosphate sales, a duty-free port selling Japanese electronic goods and cigarettes to desert legionnaires, and rich Atlantic fishing shoals.

Had the Nairobi stalemate been broken, the African peace plan would have worked as follows: after the ceasefire, a referendum would have been held, either under the UN or OAU supervision, to determine whether the nomadic inhabitants of the territory preferred independence to Moroccan rule.

However, sharp differences existed between the warring parties over who was entitled to vote in the referendum. The seven OAU 'Sages' — the presidents of Kenya (current OAU Chairman Daniel Arap Moi), Tanzania, Nigeria, Guinea, Sudan, Mali, and Sierra Leone — want the referendum list based on a 1974 census drawn up by the Spanish colonial administration. Morocco seemed to accept this point.

The Polisario demanded a new census, claiming that the old Spanish list seriously underestimates the size of the population,

most of whom fled to the southern Algerian desert when Moroccan troops moved into the former Spanish colony. According to the OAU commission report, 'the time required to prepare such (census) lists will be the main determinant in establishing a timetable for the referendum.'

The OAU peace negotiations were consequently deadlocked from the start. 'The Polisario does not exist as far as Morocco is concerned,' declared the Moroccan foreign minister, Mohammed Boucetta; and he stuck by his refusal to deal directly with the guerrillas.

Boucetta, under strict orders from King Hassan, who chose to make a two-week private visit to Paris during the OAU talks, was only willing to discuss a ceasefire with Algeria, which provides arms, cash and sanctuary to the 15,000-strong guerrilla army, and Mauritania. When Spain was forced to pull out of the desert colony in 1976 by a Moroccan sleight-of-hand — the Green March — it handed over administrative rights to the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. Much to King Hassan's anger, Mauritania withdrew from the Western Sahara, bloodied and exhausted from fighting the Polisario guerrillas.

Although OAU chairman Daniel Arap Moi reluctantly agreed not to name the warring parties, he added: 'We all know who these are.' A thin majority of the OAU countries have voted to recognise the Polisario's government-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

At the end of the talks, the committee had no choice but to send Daniel Arap Moi on a wearying and probably fruitless shuttle between Rabat, Algiers and Nouakchott (where President Khouna Ould Haydalla recently thwarted a military coup) in an attempt to end the stalemate.

UK ASKED TO SET UP ANTI-NDF COMBAT UNIT

London 8 DAYS in English No 7, 20 Feb 82 p 17

[Article by Michale Dalmoak]

[Text]

NORTH YEMEN has asked Britain for help in establishing a counter-insurgency unit to combat the growing threat from radical National Democratic Front guerrillas. The British have been asked because of their experience in dealing with guerrillas in Oman, and government sources have confirmed that 'there have been some talks about it', but apparently no decision has yet been taken.

North Yemen has also approached Jordan and the matter will undoubtedly be discussed when President Ali Abdullah Saleh arrives in Amman on 20 February as part of a tour of selected Arab capitals.

As yet there is no indication whether Sanaa wants British and Jordanian officers for active operations against the guerrillas or simply to train North Yemenis in counter-insurgency tactics. In the 1970s, for example, Britain provided a complete task force from the crack Special Air Services to quash the Aden-backed rebellion in Oman's Dhofar province.

The idea of linking up with the British may strike some as a complete turnabout in North Yemeni policy, as to date many of its military links have been with Moscow. Most of the country's arsenal is Russian; there are some 600 Soviet military advisers in North Yemen and around 1,000 North Yemenis are being trained in the Soviet Union.

Last November, President Saleh visited the Soviet-aligned regime in Aden to discuss unity, and in January it was announced that a draft constitution for a united Yemen had been drawn up. In fact, the unity talks were partly motivated by the same factor: the need to deal with the NDF, which has its base in South Yemen. The Front's guerrillas operate freely in sectors of southern North

Yemen and the Sanaa government has for some time accepted that it needs more than conventional military tactics. Saleh had hoped that following his apparently cordial talks on unity in Aden last November, South Yemen would put a stop to the NDF's activities. This did not happen: if anything the guerrilla operations intensified.

The problem, according to one North Yemeni official, is that Aden no longer controls the NDF. It has influence with the political wing, led by Sultan Omar and Yahya al Shami, but even here, there are factions which are considered, for want of a better label 'pro-Soviet and pro-Syrian', while the military wing under Abdullah Abdulalim and Mugahid al Kohali reputedly seek support from Libya.

More important, active NDF units are well equipped. The guerrillas are reported to have 26 tanks inside North Yemen and some 500 officers, all defectors from the North Yemen army. Abdulalim is typical; he used to be a North Yemen paratroop commander until his defection in early 1978.

Nevertheless, even though the funds and equipment for the NDF come through Aden, the South Yemeni authorities find it difficult to intervene, and apparently told Saleh during his visit that they were afraid to restrain the NDF because it might turn its strength against them. Some North Yemenis, however, are sceptical: 'If they wanted to do something about it, they would.'

The NDF does appear to be growing suspicious of Aden. The Front wants a share of the power in Sanaa, but in none of the recent discussions between North and South, has there been any attempt by Aden

to persuade President Saleh to bring the NDF into his government. This is the reason, say North Yemeni officials, for the escalation of the guerrilla campaign after Saleh's November visit to Aden: the NDF is determined to show its strength.

In military terms, the NDF is having a devastating effect. Between 20 and 30 North Yemeni troops are being airlifted every month for serious medical treatment in France and West Germany.

The failure to resolve the problem of the NDF politically through Aden may well have convinced Saleh that the only course available was the formation of a counter-insurgency unit in the army. This may explain the recent changes in the top military echelons. The most prominent change was that of former chief of staff Abdelaziz al Barati, a man not noted for his efficiency, who has been replaced by Hussein al Bashiri, a young army engineer who studied in Moscow for several years. There is some speculation that despite the war against the NDF the major criterion in Bashiri's appointment was his lack of the tribal links which have caused so much trouble in North Yemen.

Given the bleak military situation facing North Yemen, there seems to be a distinct political rallying to the president from various factions that until now have spent their time criticising his every move.

President Saleh's tour of the Arab capitals is unlikely to solve North Yemen's internal problems, but is seen more as a flag waving exercise to present Sanaa's views on Arab affairs. President Saleh's trip encompasses the UAE, Bahrain, Baghdad (North Yemen has been a strong supporter of Iraq in its conflict with Iran and has allowed a large number of Iraqi air force transports to lay up at Hodeida airport), possibly Damascus, and a five-day stopover in Amman before he flies to West Germany.

President Saleh intends to use the trip to revive his 'Yemen initiative' which was first announced at the Amman summit in 1980 and called for the establishment of a permanent committee to deal with inter-Arab disputes.

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